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A Week of Great Events

The week ending July 24 was in many ways the most momentous of the whole war. It saw the revolt within the German Army which, even though as we go to press it appears to have been put down, nevertheless shows that the final crackup in Germany is not far away. The same week saw the resignation of the entire Japanese Cabinet. Here again the exact meaning is obscure but there is no doubt that the fall of Premier Tojo and his associates indicates great dissatisfaction in Japan, great fear of an approaching Allied victory. The Americans landed on Guam and for the first few days at least, the operation went exceedingly well. We are justified in hoping that we shall soon recapture this, the first American soil to be invaded again by our troops after seizure by Japan. We also invaded Tinian, just south of Saipan. The Japanese invasion of India ended in almost complete disaster, the broken Japanese forces struggling to get back into Burma, leaving behind them stores of materials which they, unlike the Allies, cannot afford to lose. Everywhere else in the Pacific theater, even in China itself, things were going well for our side.

As usual, the Russian front provided the most sensational victories. All the way from Finland to Southern Poland, the Red Armies were plunging ahead against German resistance which nowhere seemed able to halt them except momentarily. In Italy, the Allied forces took the valuable seaport of Leghorn, and were on the point of enveloping Florence, despite stubborn German resistance. In Normandy, General Montgomery launched a big offensive, took Caen, and advanced some miles beyond it. The Americans took St. Lô. At the weekend, however, the British drive had almost halted, due partly to torrential rains and partly to skillful German defensive measures. The Germans were aided by the narrowness of the peninsula which prevented our making full use of our superiority of men and materials.

The Democrats Meet

On the domestic front, the chief event was, of course, the Democratic Party Convention. The renomination of President Roosevelt was a foregone conclusion and the only real interest was in the fight for the vice-presidency. Mr. Wallace was defeated by an effective combination of all the worst elements in the Democratic Party—the corrupt big-city machines of Kelly, Hague and Flynn, the Southern Tories, the unscrupulous national chairman, Robert Hannegan, who degraded his office by participating in a fight between two factions. The residuary heir of these political machinations was Senator Harry Truman of Missouri, who is on the whole a good man and deserved better than to be foisted upon the party by its worst elements. The result is the serious disaffection of Northern liberals, trade unionists and Negroes, in the states which Mr. Roosevelt most badly needs to win. The party took great pains to placate the Solid South, which in any case was absolutely sure to go Democratic. However, it still seems altogether probable that the Democrats will be reëlected, even though by a narrower margin than would otherwise have been the case. The latest Fortune poll, just released, showed Dewey running about eight points behind the President, with 42.2 to 50.8,

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a staggering difference in a national election, and far greater than the gap between the President and Willkie at the same period in the campaign four years ago.

A Compromise Platform

As in the choice of a Vice President, so in the platform was a compromise between what the liberals wanted and the demands of the conservatives. On the whole, it is a good platform, particularly in its brevity, which contrasts favorably with the bumbling Republican document. The statement on racial and religious minorities, while unsatisfactory to spokesmen for Negroes, nevertheless went far enough to anger many Southern conservatives. The platform properly "points with pride" to the Democratic achievements of the past twelve years. It goes on to advocate a world organization using force to keep the peace, though not an international police force. This international machinery should include a World Court, and be based upon the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. Like the Republican, the Democratic platform calls for opening Palestine to Jewish immigration. It asks for increased social legislation, coupled with the maintenance of competitive private enterprise.

The Democratic Winner

Nobody emerges from the Democratic National Convention with more prestige than Vice President Wallace. It was a foregone conclusion that Mr. Roosevelt would be renominated, and the convention neither added to nor subtracted from his position. If Mr. Wallace had been renominated as a consequence of Presidential support, the event would have had little significance and would not have increased the stature of the nominee. As things did turn out, Mr. Wallace is the first Democrat of prominence to stand entirely on his own feet as a leader of progressive liberalism within the party since Mr. Roosevelt's first election. In saying this we are assuming, of course, as T. R. B. argues, that his chief's letter of endorsement was more a handicap than a help. The popular support which Mr. Wallace elicited in this role impressed all observers, and while it was not powerful enough to overcome the opposition of the Southern reactionaries and the machine bosses from the North, everybody knows that it represents more closely than any other element at the convention the real voting strength of the Democratic Party. In this respect Mr. Wallace now occupies a position which is closely parallel to that of Mr. Willkie on the Republican side. He has lost his immediate opportunity for a high political job, but he has established an impregnable reputation for integrity and independence, which ought to be a valuable asset to the nation in the future.

Barrow in The Florida Times Union

The Sixty-four Dollar Question

Senator Truman is an able man with a good record, especially since the start of the war. But the Missourian, who owes his nomination to the most unsavory elements in the party, definitely has something to live down. He did live down his original indebtedness to Boss Pendergast of Kansas City, and he may repeat his performance. It would be romantic to suppose that nobody who owes his elevation to political bosses ever makes a good public servant. Nevertheless, the burden of proof is on the vice-presidential nominee. Meanwhile the progressive forces in America may learn from this incident that the sooner they cease relying on Mr. Roosevelt, and build their own independent political power, the closer they will come to achieving their objectives.

Japanese Rifts

While, as all our responsible commentators pointed out, it would be careless to be taken off our guard by the governmental overturn in Japan, it would also be unwise to assume that the Japanese political structure is so monolithic that no rift of importance can ever occur in it. Tojo and his cabinet may have resigned in order to get out while the going was good. They may have been sacrificed to a demand for scapegoats for recent defeats, or as a means of improving war morale. Their successors seem to be equally militaristic. Yet it cannot be denied that there are important elements in Japan which distrusted the militarists before they took power, disapproved of their program and will surely try to recoup what they can if the war policy is finally proved to be a failure.

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A reminder of this fact is the reissuance of Dr. Harold G. Moulton's illuminating study "Japan," written and published before the Japanese adopted the fatal course which led them into the present military adventure. This was an examination of the problems and prospects of the island empire, undertaken at the instance of some of Japan's leading commercial and banking interests. It compared the program of aggression with that of peaceful trade and industry on the model of Great Britain, and proved conclusively to any Western reader that the latter would be far more rewarding. The Japanese who elicited Dr. Moulton's conclusions, and approved them at the time, are still in existence or have their successors. They are not without economic power. They have gone along with the militarists and doubtless would have accepted the results of victory, if victory could have been achieved. But when disaster looms, they are likely to return to their original program. Of course, history cannot be unlived, and they have probably missed their opportunity. But behind the inscrutable face of Japan, their minds are undoubtedly at work.

Getting Used to Massacres

Reports seeping out of Hungary indicate that the campaign of mass murder directed against the Hungarian Jews goes on apace. The Hungarians themselves are not conspicuously anti-Semitic, but the Germans are now in complete control of the country, and are taking the opportunity to destroy Hungarian Jews just as those in Germany and Austria have so largely been destroyed. About 400,000 have already been seized in Hungary and deported to German-occupied Poland. Many of them die on the way, being jammed for this deliberate purpose into overcrowded cattle cars, without food or water. Those who survive to reach the destination are being killed off by the thousands with machine guns or in gas chambers. The world has grown so calloused to these horrors that such news is received nowadays with a shrug of the shoulders. Little is being done to rescue the Jews, though a few have been ransomed at high prices by their compatriots. The United States and Great Britain could save thousands of these unhappy victims if we would give them the protection of American or British citizenship. Even vigorous protests to Germany, with threats of vengeance after the war, would be effective; Germany always slacks off in her mistreatment of the Jews after such protests. Hitler counts on our war weariness, our selfishness, and on the fact that the human mind can react adequately to only a limited amount of suffering among strangers a long way off. Unfortunately, at this moment it looks as though Hitler were right.

Dewey on a Cake

The most devastating comment on Governor Dewey that we have heard from anyone is attributed to a Republican lady, member of a famous family. She is supposed to have said, following the Chicago convention: "After all, how can you vote for a man who looks like the bridegroom on a wedding cake?"

Democrats Face the Future

IT WAS INEVITABLE that the Democratic Convention should have furnished not only drama but scenes of bitterness. The Democrats have always since the Civil War had a deep inner cleavage within their ranks. They have been the party of the urban working class and immigrant groups, but they have also been the party of the Solid South. They have expressed the aspirations of the large mass of the underprivileged, but their idealistic leaders—in order to get and maintain power—have had to work with the Southern poll-taxers and the Big City machine bosses. It is one of the parodoxes of our political history that the social reforms of Grover Cleveland's first term, Woodrow Wilson's first term and Franklin Roosevelt's first and second terms were made possible by the fact that a wave of popular idealism was superimposed on a base formed by the Southern reactionaries and the professional politicians.

Anyone who forgets this historical framework will do scant justice to what is happening to the Democratic Party in 1944. And anyone who is surprised that President Roosevelt did not do more for Henry Wallace in the vice-presidential fight forgets the drastic experience that Mr. Roosevelt had when he tried to fight the Southern reactionaries in their home territory in the "purges" of 1938—experiences which Mr. Roosevelt himself has not forgotten. The President has never since then fought the Southerners or the bosses openly. He has relied far more on the urgent logic of events and on presenting the reactionaries with *faits accomplis* from which there was no recourse, than upon direct political challenges. When the reactionary opposition to Wallace began to organize a united front, the President did not dare risk an open and perhaps fatal split in the party by making Wallace's renomination an imperative. The stakes were too high, in his estimation, involving—as they did—the question of what leadership would finish the war, carry on demobilization and organize the peace. To counter the argument that the Democratic ticket could take the Solid South for granted, the Southern reactionaries planned the Electoral College conspiracy in Texas, South Carolina and Mississippi, threatening to throw even a Roosevelt victory to the Republicans. Thus the Roosevelt forces were ready to appease them, and the Big City professional politicians were all too ready to join them in scuttling a man who had dangerous ideas and aroused dangerous emotions.

That is the logic of what happened. The editors of The New Republic did not and do not agree with the

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estimates of the situation made by the President and his political advisers. They underestimated the popular strength that Wallace has. If the election would have been close with Wallace on the ticket, it will certainly be closer with Wallace off it. Even the "practical" politicians in the Democratic Party are now emphasizing the prime importance of getting out a big mass vote if victory is to be won. But in crucial states like New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois and California, it will be harder to get out a big mass vote for Roosevelt and Truman than it would have been for Roosevelt and Wallace, especially since in some of these states the labor and Negro vote may decide how the state's electoral vote will go.

But the past is prelude to what must now be done. The great strength of the Wallace forces insured, at least, that a liberal like Truman was the final choice of the convention rather than Byrd or even Rayburn. Truman is no Wallace, and is not a man of surpassing stature. But his record is a New Deal record, and his committee has been a fighting committee. The Roosevelt-Truman ticket deserves the fullest support of the liberal forces of America in both major parties.

Beyond the coming election, however, there is another and even greater task. It is the task of progressive organization. The great lesson of the Democratic Convention was the immense gap between popular feeling and the means for getting it translated into political power. Wallace was away ahead by all the public-opinion polls. His stature at the convention itself was such that, had the delegates been free to make their own untrammeled choice, he might well have carried a majority of them. Many of them had come to scoff at him, and remained to admire him. But the instruments of power were in the hands of the Kellys, the Hagues, the Flynns, the Hannegans.

Or look at it from a different angle. Suppose you compare Wallace and his views and his public utterances with any of the major leaders of the British Labor Party. Wallace stands up against any of them in his international liberalism and realism, his convictions about the need for genuine socialization of the instruments on which economic democracy depends, his militancy in the people's cause. No one so far to the progressive left has ever so sweepingly received the approval of the large mass of people in American history, nor ever come so close to breaking the hold of the professional politicians. In short, the people were not fighting a rearguard action under Wallace's banner. They were fighting a vanguard action. They were beaten. But in their defeat there were the conditions of a future victory.

That victory, however, will prove only the vainest kind of wishful thinking unless it is organized by hard work. The National Citizens Political Action Committee, along with the trade-union organizations of which it is an offshoot, is a good start. It will have to be continued and consolidated after the elections. Its principle of working for the election of a liberal President, and for liberal congressmen of both parties, is a good one for 1944. But beyond that we shall have to build more purposefully and more permanently at the American grass roots.

The Revolt in Germany

IN MANY WAYS, the news of the revolt of the German Army is the most important of the whole war. Because of Hitler's rigid and effective censorship, what we don't know about it is still greater in volume than what we do know. Nevertheless it is already possible to draw some highly important conclusions.

Was the Revolt Genuine? The first impulse of many persons after the news came through was to assume that the revolt was not genuine, that it was another staged Reichstag fire. It was argued that Hitler had arranged a fake attempt at assassination in order to purge his enemies before they could make any more serious trouble for him. These subtle and complicated interpretations of public events nearly always turn out to be wrong, however, and that seems to be the case this time. Hitler's broadcast gives every evidence of being genuine. So does the killing of hundreds of people inside Germany. This was a real revolt, which came very close to being successful. If it had succeeded, the German Army would have overthrown the Nazis and taken control of the country.

Has It Been Crushed? As these lines are written, on July 24, it looks as though the revolt had failed, and must be spoken of in the past tense. Very likely it will be some days before we can be certain of this; but if the rebels were winning, the picture would probably be substantially different from what it is. If this statement is correct, it suggests that the conspiracy involved only part of the top leadership of the German Army, although a large and important part. If a sufficient proportion of the officers had been involved, the mere fact that Hitler was not killed at the beginning would not have prevented a possible successful outcome.

What Did the Rebels Hope to Gain? A number of newspaper and radio commentators have been telling us that the revolt of the German Army is entirely in terms of another world war. According to this argument, the leaders hope to surrender now, keep the army intact, and fight us again after a few years or decades. It is certainly possible that some of the officers involved were thinking in these terms; perhaps even a majority were in this category. But this is another of the too-smart interpretations which usually turn out to be wrong historically. The professional soldiers of Germany are presumably patriotic and devoted men. They are realists where the Nazis are hysterical fanatics

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who care little about the death of other people, or even of themselves, in the Nazi cause. It is just possible that some at least of the officers wanted to surrender now for the simple reason that they are sure they will be defeated, hope to get better terms now than later, want to spare the German people the additional misery of continued bombing and of seeing their land turned into a battlefield as the Allies advance from both East and West.

Even if the army leaders hope to keep their organization intact and fight again some years from now, this does not mean that if they had been successful in overthrowing Hitler, the rest of the plan would also have succeeded. The surrender would in any case be unconditional. It would rest with the Allies to say whether and on what terms Germany would in the future be allowed any armed forces whatsoever. We should indeed be fools if this time we failed to destroy the army, once and forever, and failed also to break up the great estates of the land-owning Prussians who form the hard core of the military clique.

How Long Has the Revolt Been Brewing? The quarrel between Hitler and the Wehrmacht has been going on as long as Hitler has been in power, and longer. The army has always secretly hated, feared and despised him. They have despised him as an upstart with no birth or breeding behind him, and as an incompetent, inexperienced military commander who has cost the Germans one defeat after another and the needless sacrifice of millions of German lives. Indeed, by his list of colossal blunders, now so well known, he undoubtedly lost to the Germans that victory in the war which at one time was so clearly in their grasp. The army gave in to Hitler and the Nazis only because it had to temporarily, when by his mixture of demogoguery and terrorism Hitler had succeeded in getting control of the country. They played along with him at the beginning because they thought they could use him, and afterward, because he promised them what military men want more than anything else, a chance to make war and a succession of victories. But when the victories began to turn into defeats, defeats for which Hitler was to blame, they, like other powerful elements in the community, turned against him. Seemingly, they struck too soon, and without the degree of careful preparation that they required. That is why it seems probable that the plot was restricted in personnel even though practically the whole army has the hostile attitude toward Hitler outlined above.

What Will the Final Outcome Be? While the revolt appears at this writing to have been crushed, there is no doubt that it will hasten the coming debacle for Germany. It was already evident that, barring accident, her final defeat was not far off. This most recent development certainly brings it nearer. The German Army had almost a monopoly of real military brains in the Reich. The Nazi leaders, with few exceptions, knew and cared little about military strategy as it is known and studied by the professional army man. These Nazis are now less than ever likely to hold out against Hitler's intuition, which has led the country into disaster so often in the past. Every officer throughout the army is bound to be under suspicion of having participated in the plot, or of secretly sympathizing. The same is true of the German Navy, where the revolt broke out in 1918 which precipitated Germany's surrender. A military machine under the best of conditions is a strained and overworked mechanism. Even before this revolt, the German defense was pushed to the breaking point. It is quite possible that the revolt may have cut the remaining length of the war in half, may have reduced it from six months to three, or from ten months to five. We do not believe that to talk in such terms is too optimistic, in view of the total situation today.

Government Spending and Jobs

THE SHARPEST CONFLICT about postwar policy, both within the United States and internationally, concerns the fiscal and monetary measures to be adopted. Great Britain has officially taken the position that government must be responsible for the maintenance of full employment, and must stimulate activity, if necessary, by low interest rates and governmental spending or investment. In the United States the same view has been advanced by a group of economists, but it has not taken form in any official expression, and it is opposed by influential bankers and the Republican platform. If those in power in this country insist that the budget be balanced under all conditions, especially at drastically reduced rates of taxes, it is almost certain that sooner or later we shall have a postwar depression, and it is completely certain that a deep chasm will develop between the United States and Britain.

Hope that this misfortune may be avoided is aroused by a report just issued by the National Planning Association, "Fiscal and Monetary Policy," by Beardsley Ruml and H. Christian Sonne. The authors of this report hold prominent positions in business and finance, and will be listened to with respect by most of those who have been hostile to compensatory fiscal policy. The NPA itself is conducting its postwar planning mainly through three committees: one consisting of eminent business men, one of labor officials and one of leaders in agriculture. Any policy endorsed by these three committees will carry more weight than the pronouncement of any special-interest group or any individual authority. The report in question was issued for study and discussion and has not been endorsed by the committees, but was prepared at their request and is being sympathetically considered by them. The business committee "finds itself in agreement with the

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broad principles which are stated therein," the labor committee has found "significant areas of agreement," and the agriculture committee is using the report as the basis of its study.

The report frankly advocates a compensatory fiscal policy on the part of government, stating that it is unrealistic not to support "federal action through budgetary operations, when requisite to maintain adequate effective demand, and therefore to contribute to the attainment of high employment." The report is distinguished from most other proposals of the kind, however, including the Woolton report on which British policy will probably be based, by a manner of stating the problem which avoids most of the objections hitherto raised by business conservatives, and by more concrete recommendations.

It begins, for instance, with a statement of national policy which includes as objectives not only high employment but "vigorous private enterprise as induced by effective incentive to risk-taking and responsibility." It emphasizes that the basic objectives of fiscal and monetary policy are "a reliable money system, a sound banking structure and a satisfactory credit mechanism." It admits that while fiscal policy can contribute to high employment, it is not the only requirement. It recognizes that unless the leaders of business, labor and agriculture have confidence in this policy, and understand it, its benefits cannot be fully realized.

The report then goes on to point out that the policy it advocates does not contemplate permanent budget deficits, does not justify spending for its own sake and does not approve wasteful expenditure. It may be brought about in large measure by reduction of taxes rather than by enlarged spending.

The essentials of the program recommended are definite and relatively simple. An agreement is to be reached upon what would be a sufficiently high level of employment in year 194x, after reconversion to civilian production is well advanced. This can be estimated on the basis of the present labor force and the probable additions to or subtractions from it. The aim will be to balance the national budget at this level of employment. Then, without any change in tax rates, the budget will become unbalanced when employment is less than the agreed level. If inflationary conditions occur, a budgetary surplus will arise which can be used for retiring the debt. Tax rates, once set, are not to be changed because of cyclical fluctuations in business and employment.

The next step is to lay out the expenditures and taxes which will balance the budget at the agreed level. Estimates based on the present and expected national income, the probable postwar military and other expenses, indicate that a sizeable tax reduction will leave enough revenue. How is this tax reduction to be made?

Here comes a recommendation which will further endear the program to business. Corporation income taxes are to be abolished, and a franchise tax of five percent is to be substituted. The purpose is to prevent taxation of profits from influencing business decisions. Before progressives condemn this proposal, they should note the reasons for it and the recommendations that go with it. It is notorious that high taxes on profits lead to the padding of business expenses and reserves. It is also probable that in some cases they discourage new investment in business ventures. Provisions are suggested to prevent the corporate form from being used as an escape from personal taxes, and to prevent corporations from building up uninvested and untaxed surpluses. The profits which are distributed to stockholders will be subject to the progressive tax on personal incomes, which, it is recommended, shall be the main reliance for federal revenue. The report opposes sales taxes and advocates the abolition of most excise taxes. Even so, the personal income-tax rates can be considerably reduced below war levels.

On the expenditure side, the federal government is to stimulate construction, when it shows signs of falling off, by public works and by loans. The aim here should be to stabilize the construction industry itself, rather than to use it to compensate for all possible shrinkage in economic activity. But if the construction industry were stabilized, a mighty barrier against depression would be erected. Remaining variations could more easily be dealt with.

The authors believe that these measures, plus others such as a more sensible system of financing the social-security program and provisions to facilitate investment in small business enterprises, would go a long way toward equalizing savings and investment. Whether they would be sufficient may be doubted, but certainly they would be a big step in the right direction. It is difficult to see how even the most conservative could oppose a moderate program of this kind, especially one which requires so little discretion on the part of executive officials.

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A Journal of Opinion

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Throwing Wallace to the Wolves

THIS IS NOT a reporter's report from the convention, for I have spent convention week and the one before that doing little but working for the renomination of Henry Wallace—politicking instead of interviewing, being partisan instead of objective, as a good reporter is supposed to be. And I believe I understand the 1944 Democratic convention the better for having seen it that way.

Months before this convention assembled it was perfectly clear that Vice President Wallace was to be the target at which the reactionary Democrats who are afraid to shoot at the President would aim. In many Southern states, the Democratic conventions specifically instructed their delegates to vote for any vice-presidential candidate except Wallace. Most of the press has consistently ridiculed his speeches and gone to all lengths to brand him an "impractical idealist." The big bosses of the party have hated him because he has never sought their support; Mayor Ed Kelly of Chicago and Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City have never recovered from the incident during the 1940 convention when Wallace left the table where they were lunching rather than be photographed with the bosses. The year-in and year-out party workers who are the guts of the Democratic organization still thought of Henry Wallace primarily as a renegade Republican, as a man who became a Democrat by appointment to the President's cabinet rather than by working his way up through ward and district hierarchy.

For all these men, mowing down Wallace was the main item of the agenda from Chicago. Their plan of operation became clear to the Wallace supporters from watching Hannegan's shenanigans.

Almost from the first day he went to work as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Bob Hannegan has been out to remove Henry Wallace from the vice-presidential chair and put Harry Truman, Senator from Hannegan's home state of Missouri, in his place. Hannegan has said that he owes his appointment to the party's top job to Ed Flynn and Missouri's Senator Clark. Ed Flynn and the other bosses made it a 1944 "must" to dump Wallace, so Hannegan went to work.

The first step was to convince the President that he needed a new running mate, and that was not easy. The disaffection of the Southern Democrats and their fear of Wallace were impressed on the President. The need for a vice-presidential nominee who would offset the President's liberalism rather than emphasize it and who would inspire enthusiasm inside the party organization, were dwelt upon by caller after caller at the White House. But the President smilingly insisted that Henry Wallace was still his choice and showed his preference to the public by sending the Vice President as his personal envoy on an important mission.

Wallace returned from the Far East to find the political wolves waiting to devour him. Another gang beside Hannegan and the bosses was after him now, the Tommy Corcoran-Bill Douglas-Georgetown set, the New Deal's amateur politicians who have been running Mr. Justice Douglas for some job or other ever since he left Yale for Washington in the early thirties. Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes and Attorney General Francis Biddle were allied with the Corcoran satellites who alternately urged Douglas or Speaker Sam Rayburn in the weeks before Chicago. Their arguments for their vice-presidential candidates were just as injurious to Wallace as Hannegan's frontal attacks, although I do not believe they were conscious allies of the machine men.

Apparently about this time the President began to grow tired of being pressured. He wanted Wallace but he did not want to take on the political battle necessary to get him and still keep "party harmony." So Wallace and Mr. Roosevelt agreed that the Vice President should fight his own fight to keep his job, and the President gave him as a weapon—such as it was—his personal endorsement.

The battle ground now shifted to Chicago. The managers of the principal contenders left Washington several days before the convention was scheduled to begin, and so did the President. There is a long established Democratic Party tradition that its chairman, who is chosen to serve the whole party, shall not work for the nomination of any special candidate. Therefore few of the regulars suspected Bob Hannegan of doubling as Senator Truman's campaign manager until the convention was under way. Two days before the convention opened the closest observers could see the machine going into operation. For Monday and most of Tuesday the special daily double touted on Bob's Little Blue Card was Roosevelt and Byrnes. Forty-eight hours was long enough for even the suckers to figure out that that was a bad selection, so a new choice was suggested.

Before the convention members went to bed Tuesday night, most of the heavy-duty gossips and all the press knew that at Mayor Kelly's dinner for convention notables that evening, Hannegan and Kelly had privately passed the word to the key men present that a "message" had been received from the President saying Truman was the man. The next day, Hannegan told a few members of the press that the President's message was that he would be glad to run on the same ticket with Harry Truman and that Truman would bring real strength to the ticket.

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Strange things began to happen. In any normal convention, the mass of the delegates would have accepted the bosses' decision, some enthusiastically, some resignedly. But this was no normal convention. Even the old timers commented on the unusual amount of fighting spirit and independence there was around. This was the CIO Political Action Committee's debut in Democratic circles, and its members who came to Chicago had a great deal to do with this changed atmosphere. Their determination to see Henry Wallace renominated grew out of their conviction that he alone of the candidates stood for the people's rights first, and their determination was contagious. Chairman Bob Hannegan had already indicated to the convention what the party leaders wanted through his carefully planted story of a second message from the President endorsing Truman, when Henry Wallace arrived in Chicago to lead his own fight. Scarcely a reporter left Wallace's press conference Wednesday afternoon without a feeling of deep respect for this shy man who nevertheless said that he would fight to the finish for the vice-presidential nomination. And when the Vice President entered the hall that evening to take his seat with the Iowa delegation, the bosses were confounded to see Henry Wallace given the first ovation of the convention. These were Democrats shouting and pushing just to come near to this man, many of the same ones who in the same hall four years before had booed him.

That same afternoon something even more dangerous to boss domination happened. One of the outstanding organization men of the party turned on the would-be dictators and told the public what was going on. Senator Joseph F. Guffey, of Pennsylvania, was the first "politician" to take his stand for Wallace's renomination. His great experience in practical political management was the most valuable weapon Wallace had within the convention, and his willingness to tell the bosses' secrets out loud was their greatest source of annoyance. Joe Guffey accused Hannegan, Kelly, Hague and Flynn of trying to dictate to the convention.

Wallace received another ovation when he appeared on Thursday afternoon to second the nomination of President Roosevelt. Surely now it was time for the bosses to get tough. Hannegan was rushed away from the hall under Kelly police escort for a hurry-up press conference at which he formally announced that he was for Truman and heavy-handedly implied that Truman was also the President's first choice. Back at the Stadium at the evening session, Mayor Kelly unfairly shushed his band and his organ during Wallace demonstrations, jammed all the aisles of the convention floor with "guests" and so over-packed the Stadium that persons injured or overcome provided sufficient pretext for adjourning the session without taking up the vice-presidential nominations as the cheering Wallace supporters were demanding.

The bosses went into their hotel rooms and settled down to frantic work the whole night through. Delegation heads were routed out of their beds for a working-over. Stories of telephone conversations with the President were used as clubs to beat them back into line. By the time the convention reassembled to select the vice-presidential nominee on Friday morning, it was apparent that the bosses had put in a good night's work and that in this department professionals are still slicker than amateurs. But the Wallace forces yet had a strong chance if they could hold together in the floor fight to come. At this point, too, the professional touch was worth a great deal. Experienced floor leaders were not numerous on Wallace's side. Many of his lieutenants were on a convention floor for the first time. Some of the Wallace supporters in state delegations had never been through the pressure of quick caucuses and unit-rule drives. They did not know the advanced art of stopping a bandwagon before it begins to roll. And when the crucial second ballot came up, the machine took over. The private deals began to emerge. Jim Farley came out from under his camouflage vote for Bankhead to say that with Wallace out, he intends to support the Democratic ticket. It will be interesting to see what happens between Farley and the State Democratic Committee in New York.

Wallace and the liberals lost the decision at Chicago. Senator Truman's record on basic issues is sufficiently progressive and his total record is sufficiently clean to make it possible for every progressive to choose Roosevelt and Truman instead of Dewey and Bricker without a moment's hesitation or doubt. But because they picked the winner at Chicago, the bosses are more tightly in control of the machinery of the Democratic Committee itself than they were before. After the election is safely won, a major job will be to take control of the party machinery away from Hannegan and his friends before another election comes around.

The battle of Chicago was well worth the fight. More liberals learned more about actual political action on the national scale than ever before. Henry Wallace by speaking out more plainly and more fearlessly than any other man has done in a long time, has made himself the symbol of the liberal fight. Those who fought for Wallace learned to recognize and watch out for those who dodge the fight, like the former "liberal" congressman who told me, "I would like to be for Wallace. I agree with what he stands for, but I'm not sure that he is going to win."

When the 1940 convention adjourned, the progressive Democrats knew that the battle we have just fought was bound to come. They knew what had to be done to prepare for it, but only the beginnings of the preparations were made. The Democratic Party can again be made a liberal party. The time to get ready for 1948 is now.

Washington HELEN FULLER

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The Press and Public Opinion [1]

I. *The Policy of the Press*

It is commonly believed that popular newspapers, like the Hearst press and The New York Daily News, exert little influence on the political opinions of their readers. But on the contrary, Dr. Gerhart Saenger has discovered, after careful scientific inquiry, that this is not true. His evidence and conclusions are set forth in a series of two articles, of which this is the first. – THE EDITORS

IT IS a widespread assumption that the popular press has little influence on the formation of public opinion, and, through it, on major political decisions. The present writer believes the influence of the press has been greatly underestimated.

We entered this war in spite of the isolationist press. But we do not know how much confusion, psychological and material unpreparedness, can be attributed to its influence. In the last election campaign the majority of the press favored Willkie, but Roosevelt was reëlected. It is conceivable that his majority would have been even larger with a more evenly divided press, and that the distribution of seats in Congress would have been affected. But even if we acknowledge the diminishing influence of the press on the outcome of national elections, this does not imply a diminishing influence on such major questions of policy as our attitude toward our allies, toward another League of Nations, toward social reform or bureaucracy.

The great influence of the press on public opinion concerning the principal issues of foreign and domestic postwar planning was shown in a study recently undertaken in New York City. This study indicated a division of opinion, according to the papers read by different sections of the population, both on questions of domestic planning and on international coöperation after the war. Newspapers were found to influence their readers not only by the attitudes expressed on various questions, but also by the amount of information released on different aspects of postwar planning. The study undoubtedly has wide significance, since the factors operating in New York are also at work in other parts of the country.

In this study 300 persons from all walks of life, business men and workers, rich and poor, old and young, were interviewed on questions of postwar planning and international coöperation. They were asked to express in their own words what they would like to see done in this country after the war, and to what degree they thought we should coöperate with other nations. They were asked whether they had heard of specific postwar plans and whether they could recall any of them. Their attitudes toward proposals for social reform were ascertained. Finally, all persons were questioned as to the papers they read.

At the same time a study of the metropolitan press ascertained not only the stand taken by the different papers on the same questions about which the public was interviewed, but also how the press reported different postwar plans and what position it took on questions of international coöperation after the war. This study showed that the New York press, not unlike that in other parts of the nation, could be divided into three groups according to attitudes on these issues, attitudes later found reflected in reader's opinions.

The Daily News, The Daily Mirror and The Journal-American were sharply opposed to both the Beveridge and the National Resources Planning Board report. They were skeptical of the idea of international coöperation after the war. A second group, the conservative, "middle-of-the-road" press, including The Times, Herald Tribune, Sun and World-Telegram, was slightly less critical of the reports and favored international coöperation. Lastly, the liberal Post and PM favored both the postwar plans and international coöperation.

Differences in editorial policy were clearly discernible in the amount of space given to the reports. The "middle-of-the-road" and liberal papers devoted on the average more than four times as much space to them as did The News, Mirror and Journal-American.

Headlines also reflected the differences in editorial policy. The News headed its first article on the NRPB plan, "Government Share in Business Postwar Aim," another "FDR Seeks Still More Power After the War." The Journal-American announced in a large red headline, "Postwar Plan Opposed." An immediate negative reaction was created by the suggestion that the plan meant a further encroachment of government on business and would give dictatorial powers to the Chief Executive.

Economic reconstruction, job security and demobilization, which furnished the chief content of the plan, were not mentioned in the headlines of the above papers, but were stressed in the liberal press: "Showdown on Security," "War Aims Worth Winning," "FDR Sends Congress Program to Abolish Want and Insecurity, Give Jobs to Everyone," were the heads in The Post and PM. Papers like The Times and The Herald Tribune preferred factual headlines, stressing

[1] The author is indebted to the Social Research Laboratory of the City College of New York for statistical data included in his articles.

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both aspects of the report, the expansion of the social-security program as well as the plans for industry.

Since many people read nothing but headlines and others select their reading on the basis of them, public information depends to a great extent on headline treatment. But attempts to influence readers' attitudes are obvious in the articles discussing the plan and other references to it. Two-thirds of all references to the NRPB report in The News, Mirror and Journal-American opposed the plan. Almost all references in the liberal press favored it. To discredit the plan, papers opposed to it emphasized mainly the proposal for joint government-industry management of some strategic industries, although in the original NRPB release only a few paragraphs dealt with this proposal, while the bulk of the report was devoted to the social-security program. A typical example showing the use of emphasis as a means of influencing public opinion was found in The Daily News:

Washington, D. C., March 10 (U.P.).—President Roosevelt today sent to Congress a revolutionary plan to achieve "freedom from want" through unprecedented government influence over the nation's postwar business and an immediately expanded "cradle-to-grave" social-security system.

The program, drawn up by the National Resources Planning Board, recommended that in a vast overhauling of the economic system the government go into partnership with many private businesses and allow labor to share in industrial management.

Attempts to influence public opinion against international coöperation followed similar lines. Arguing against the proposal to send food to devastated countries after the war, one newspaper stated that it would be impossible for America, with her 130 million inhabitants, to feed the whole world population of more than two billion. (We of course have never intended to send food to all countries in the world, but only to supplement the food supply of those countries unable to support themselves.) The paper implies that every other country in the world would immediately stop all food production after the termination of hostilities. Yet the imperceptive reader will hardly avoid this logical pitfall and will become frightened at the cost and magnitude of such a relief program.

The value and possibility of close international cooperation after the war is further questioned by the formerly "isolationist" papers on the ground that each nation is only interested in its own welfare and hence incapable of true coöperation.

The reactionary Daily News, Daily Mirror and Journal-American have attacked government control of business without let-up. They have branded international coöperation as an idle dream and demanded instead an America strong enough to stand by herself. This trend is reflected in their readers' opposition to increased governmental control of business. It is reflected in the large proportion of isolationists found among them—more than in any other group of papers. The narrow, self-centered outlook of these readers finds its clearest expression in their attitudes on concrete measures designed to alleviate the sufferings of the nationals of foreign countries, to open our frontiers to those who seek refuge within the limitations of our quota system. Readers of this group of papers include the largest proportion of persons opposed to our help in the relief and rehabilitation of foreign countries. Two-thirds of their readers want to close our frontiers to any further immigration. They say that "charity begins at home," that "foreigners are inferior," that we should think of ourselves first, a point of view expressed frequently in editorials, articles and letters to the editors appearing in these papers.

The following chart shows the attitudes of New Yorkers toward different domestic and international postwar problems, by newspapers read and by the percentage of readers expressing an opinion:

	Newspapers Read		
	I	II	III
	News, Mirror, Journal-American	Times, Herald Tribune, Sun, World-Telegram	Post, PM
Domestic Issues			
Amount of government control of business desired after the war compared to pre-war times:			
More	22	41	74
Same	32	27	17
Don't know	24	9	6
Less	22	23	3
Increase of unemployment insurance wanted:			
Yes	57	53	90
No	43	47	10
International Issues			
Should we continue immigration after the war?			
Yes	36	46	70
No	64	54	30
Should we send relief to other countries even if we have to continue rationing?			
Yes	62	71	98
No	38	29	2
Form of international coöperation wanted:			
World state or federation	9	28	37
United Nations or League	39	34	39
Other and don't know	30	25	16
No coöperation desired	22	13	8

During the last four years the editorial policy of the New York press has been consistent. It is therefore not surprising that the constant repetition of these same attitudes has left its mark on the opinion of its readers, who frequently repeat the very arguments quoted in their pages.

GERHART SAENGER

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The Broader Issues of Bretton Woods

A Plea for British-American Coöperation

WITHOUT BRITISH-AMERICAN COÖPERATION, international economic stabilization is not possible; and without this stability, high levels of employment at decent standards of living will not be attained in this country. Coöperation is required not for purposes of altruism toward the British or the world, but to further American interests. A good-neighbor policy does not mean giving one's worldly goods away. Joint efforts will mean joint rewards.

British-American Income and Trade.—Before the war the United States had approximately one-quarter of the world's national income, the United Kingdom about one-tenth. Inclusive of the income of the other members of the British Commonwealth, the United States and the British Commonwealth accounted for perhaps 45 percent of the world's monetary national income. At the present time the figure may well be one-half. These countries also accounted for approximately 40 percent of world trade. With these countries responsible for such a large part of world income and trade, it must be clear that prosperity in the United States, the United Kingdom and countries tied to the latter is a necessary condition for world prosperity. Depression in the United States and in the British Commonwealth, or in one or the other, is almost certain to bring a large measure of depression and unemployment the world over. Few countries in the world, if any, can expect prosperity when the United Kingdom and the United States are depressed; and economic conditions in many countries will be helped by satisfactory conditions in the United States and Britain.

A glimpse at British economic history since World War I will be helpful in understanding Britain's aims at the Bretton Woods Conference. The events of the last 25 years have determined her course. From 1920 to 1931, she tried to reëstablish her international position through the application of the usual orthodox measures: she returned to the gold standard; she tried to cut wages through the imposed terror of unemployment; she attempted rationalization of industry. All these orthodox measures failed.

Forced off gold in 1931, Britain, more by accident than by design, experimented with new techniques: through recourse to exchange depreciation, she cut her prices on world markets; she expanded her exports, which in turn raised her income; she launched a program of domestic investment; and finally, she instituted imperial preference and other trade restrictions. These unorthodox measures succeeded and Britain led the world back to partial recovery. The United States meanwhile, hampered by the use of archaic techniques, struggled on in the depression; so did France which, under the unyielding pressure of the rentier class, held on to the gold standard five years longer than the British, thus allowing herself to be pulled down by the restrictionist monetary policies required under this standard.

Ordinarily, a country which expands relative to the rest of the world buys too much abroad and sells too little. That country will then lose gold or witness a depreciation of her exchanges. The thirties were not ordinary times, however. Relative expansion in Great Britain was accompanied by an inflow of gold and a strengthening of sterling. Any propensity to buy too much was checked by new trade policies or offset by the relative improvement of exports associated with the early depreciation, and the return flow of capital. There was now general agreement by both foreign buyers of British goods and owners of capital that sterling at $3.50 was a bargain.

The British have never forgotten the lessons of this period; there is little likelihood that they ever will. They know that if they are tied irrevocably to gold they may not be able to provide their economic system with the amount of money required to maintain the optimum amount of employment and income. For under gold, sterling must be freely convertible into gold and if an excessive amount of sterling is manufactured—that is, excessive in the sense that purchases abroad are increased too much, with expansion at home—then free convertibility at a fixed price (*e. g.*, four pounds equalling one ounce of gold) is followed by losses of gold and monetary contraction at home. If, however, convertibility of sterling into gold at a fixed price is not required, the country may well be able to adjust the supply of money to the needs of the economy; and the authorities will not fret over the losses of gold. When unemployment is widespread, the British government will create demand through the expansion of money. Incomes will rise and soon prices will begin to rise. If international disequilibrium follows, then there is a way out. The Bretton Woods Conference is planning the techniques to facilitate just that.

The British must have foreign trade in order to survive. Through their imports they obtain the necessary supplies of food and raw materials with which to sustain their population. Whereas the United Kingdom has about two percent of the world's population, in 1929 and 1938 it had 13 and 14 percent of the world's trade respectively. The United States, on the other hand, with approximately six percent of the world's popula-

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tion had 14 percent of the world's trade in 1929 and less than 11 percent in 1938.

Export trade should account for at least 10 percent of Britain's national income in the postwar world. And if, with a full-employment income, world imports respond in the expected manner, her export trade may well rise to 12 to 15 percent of her national income, as compared to an average of approximately five percent for the United States in the thirties. These figures give some indication of the importance of foreign trade to the British economy.

The Problem of the British Exchanges. – In a recent prewar year the British imported £900 million of commodities and exported £600 million, paying for the difference with dollars and other foreign currencies received for shipping and foreign investments. In view of the large losses suffered in her foreign investments as a result of the war, and the reduction of shipping revenues to be expected as a result of shipping losses and increased competition, Britain will be fortunate indeed if of the £300 million of foreign currencies received on past investments, shipping, insurance and the like, she retains £100 million of annual returns for these items in the postwar period. According to a recent British White Paper, private and government investments abroad in the years 1939-43 have declined by approximately £3 billion, exclusive of Lend-Lease. Blocked balances in London are now no less than £3 billion. Even when Britain could count on capital invested abroad, shipping, etc., to pay for one-third of the total imports, she had great difficulty in maintaining a position of international equilibrium. Many of her troubles in the twenties and thirties arose because she tended to import too much relative to her exports of goods and services. The result was a constant pressure on her gold supplies and her exchanges, with resulting deflationary monetary policies at home and accompanying unemployment.

Whatever her difficulties in the prewar period, her problems in the international field in the postwar period will be much more serious. She has largely committed herself to the Beveridge plan which will require approximately 10 percent of the national income. (This is not all additional of course.) The plan will be a burden on British industry and will tend to increase costs and aggravate the position of the exporter. This burden of 10 percent of the national income incurred on account of social security compares with a total tax burden of 23 percent of private income in 1938 and of 36 percent in 1943. How costly the Beveridge plan will be, however, will depend on the amount of unemployment; and it is partly for this reason that the government has now announced a comprehensive program for full employment. If a goal of full employment is attained, then the cost of the Beveridge Plan will be considerably less than otherwise.

This program of full employment as announced in the recent British White Paper will also tend to raise costs of British industry in relation to costs abroad, for the burden on the taxpayer will tend to be increased. As these costs rise, pressure on the balance of payments is intensified, both because exports are discouraged and because imports tend to become cheaper than similar domestic commodities. Not only do imports tend to become cheaper, but the country tends to import more because as incomes rise, some proportion of the additional income is spent on foreign goods.

Having tasted full employment during the war, the British refuse to turn back to the old days of recurrent unemployment. However beneficial their new policies may be in the domestic area, the effect on the balance of payments may well be disastrous. It is for this reason that the British are so much interested in what goes on at Bretton Woods and in the attitude of the American people toward monetary stabilization and international monetary reserves.

The British are, then, committed to an elastic monetary policy, one which adjusts the supply of money to the needs of the economy and not to the inflexible old-time policy with its requirement that sterling always be convertible into gold at a fixed price. The latter policy was tried in the twenties and failed. If unemployment develops in the post-war period, the British will increase demand for labor and other resources through the expansion of the supply of money and, if necessary, the government will borrow the necessary funds. In this common-sense manner, employment will be kept at a high level.

Alternative Attacks by the British. – Of the greatest importance, obviously, is the problem of reconciling domestic expansion with international stability. There are various alternatives. First, it would be very helpful to the British if similar policies of assurance of full employment were enacted in other countries. (And what country is averse to full employment?) In that case, the British would not have to worry much about the adverse balance of payments. If the British tended to import more as their income rose, other countries would also tend to import more as their incomes rose. In that case, the rise of imports by the British would be offset by a rise of exports. And higher costs of exports in Great Britain, associated with the social-security program and a domestic-investment policy, would be accompanied by similar increased costs in other industrial nations. This would be the ideal solution to the implementation of the British policy. It is not clear, however, that this policy will be forthcoming in other industrial nations. In any case, the British cannot afford to bank on it.

This brings us to the second alternative which confronts the British. They may embark on their domestic full-employment policy and adopt a flexible exchange

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policy, but subject to scrutiny according to the formula adopted at Bretton Woods. When exports are too small and imports too large, the British then might adjust their exchanges to the required degree. If they depreciate the pound, the British will be able to sell more and, if necessary, to buy less. In this manner, they might expand at home and yet not dissipate too many of their domestic pounds on foreign exchange markets with the resultant disequilibrium in the balance of payments.

Now where does the United States' self-interest fit into this British picture? Our interests run exactly parallel to Britain's. The American people now have an opportunity to choose between international collaboration and a program of economic isolationism. If a program is not approved along the lines of the joint statement or of the Bretton Woods Conference, then the only alternative for the British is to embark on the program of social security and domestic investment to which they are committed and which they dare not abandon, and to use other means to attain economic equilibrium in the international field. They will then institute competitive debasement and related programs which would tend to keep down their imports and increase their exports. These are the policies that engender international ill feeling and cut-throat competition and may well lead to World War III. Political isolationism seems to be dead, but we cannot as yet say the same for economic isolation.

The alternatives to a program of international coöperation as provided at Bretton Woods are as follows: First, the British will vigorously push their cartel program under which the complying countries agree to restrict trade and keep prices up. They will also push further bilateral trade agreements with members of the Empire and others, and in this way squeeze out of world markets countries that are committed to multilateral trade agreements—notably the United States. They will also have to resort to exchange control and other restrictionist measures in order to cut imports. Hence the British will reduce their imports to a minimum and expand exports by the use of petty-bargaining measures—beggar-my-neighbor remedies—and of all kinds of restrictions. They will seek equilibrium in world trade through contraction in the international field and they will to that extent contribute toward world-wide depression. This they will have to do in self-defense if we block the alternative, which would be to attain international equilibrium in an expanding world economy.

The Interest of the United States. – The British cannot turn back and should not. They are committed to a program of full employment. It is hoped that this can be accompanied by collaboration in the international field. If it is not, then large losses will be suffered by the United States; for we are committed to a policy of multilateral trade agreements. We are counting on $8 billion of export trade and five million jobs from foreign trade in the postwar world. This is an important ingredient in our program for a full-employment income. If the British are forced to embark on bilateralism, exchange control, cartels and the like, then a large part of the expected improvement from an export trade of $3 billion in the prewar period to $8 billion in the postwar period in the United States will not be forthcoming. The loss of a large part of this $8 billion of export trade will be serious indeed. Every dollar loss of export trade will account for a considerably larger loss in our national income. For particular sections of the country the results will be disastrous indeed. We may take as one instance the cotton-growing states which are so dependent upon the exportation of cotton.

Again, American manufacturers are very much concerned over their excess capacity in the postwar period. The country has added $20 billion of new plants of a very high efficiency. In terms of output our total manufacturing-plant capacity has increased very substantially in the war period. No one who has talked to exporters or to the manufacturers who are banking on export sales can overlook their stake in these potential markets. These export markets will be made available only by all countries pulling themselves up to rising-income levels and increased imports from abroad, and not by pulling themselves down through all kinds of restrictions which will follow if the Bretton Woods Conference fails to achieve its main purposes.

Many are vigorously attacking the Bretton Woods program. Political isolationists, having failed in their main objective, are doing their best to befuddle the issues. Bankers have fought the program for international economic collaboration especially vigorously. They anticipate loss of business opportunities to the fund, and resulting reductions in the rate of interest—a high rate of interest being some bankers' erroneous prescription for prosperity; and they like many other business men are apprehensive of the use of $2-$3 billion of taxpayers' money for the fund.

These are ill-founded bogeys. The bankers welcomed the net inflow of $17 billion of gold in the eight years preceding our entry into the war. For this gold we gave goods and capital (rights to future goods). They would have opposed vigorously a program to exclude this gold with resulting adverse effects on our export trade. Yet today they carry on a concerted program to prevent the investment of perhaps a billion dollars of gold (and to some extent goods) annually for several years, which will tend to give the world the necessary conditions (*e.g.*, monetary stabilization) for a high level of exports. In 1934-41, it was sound policy to take $17 billion of gold we did not need and did not want and which in fact brought unstable conditions abroad, and to give our goods in exchange; but to give back

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part of the gold which we do not need at a much smaller rate than in 1934-41 is now held by them to be a dangerous and uneconomic policy.

Those who oppose the program because it will cut interest rates are taking a short-sighted view. Lower interest rates are a necessary condition of a high level of employment and incomes. Bankers would do well to compare their incomes in 1931-34, when interest rates were high, with those of 1940-43, when low interest rates prevailed.

At Bretton Woods programs have been discussed which propose to reconcile national programs directed to assuring high levels of national income and employment with international equilibrium. Under proposed programs of collaboration, exchanges will be more flexible than under gold, and the only curtailment of freedom will be the curtailment of freedom to injure other nations through unwarranted depreciation. We shall also have an international fund which will serve to reduce the frequency and amplitude of changes in exchange rates; which will preclude unnecessary, costly internal adjustments (*e. g.*, cuts in wage rates, compulsory transfers of workers and capital); and which will give a breathing spell when fundamental adjustments are required. Countries seeking access to these reserves may be advised that fundamental adjustments are required and that they should not seek the easy way out of exchange depreciation.

The main issue is whether monetary systems are to be the handmaiden of our economies, or whether we are going to make our economies subservient to the gold standard. A second issue is whether the abandonment of the orthodox gold standard, which is inevitable, is going to set off a reversion to competitive debasement reminiscent of the practice of the Middle Ages and the thirties; or whether we shall require that countries pursuing independent economic policies at home consider the interests of their neighbors. Failure at Bretton Woods or failure of our government to approve international collaboration inevitably leads to competitive debasement and political crisis.

It is to be hoped that Senator Taft's recent prediction of Congressional rejection of the plan will prove to be wrong. We now know that in 1919 Senatorial opposition to international political coöperation was a Pandora's box. Without economic coöperation, this time not even hope would remain.

SEYMOUR E. HARRIS

Mayor Lausche of Cleveland

When Mayor Frank J. Lausche of Cleveland comes out of his office to greet you shyly, the last thing in the world you would ascribe to the man is political oomph. He is tall, somewhat handsome and has a thick crop of dark hair that seems to curl straight upward. He has a trim figure at 48, as befits a former semi-pro ball-player, and a dark cast of countenance, as befits the son of a Slovenian steel worker. The Mayor is addicted to bow-ties, nickel cigars and poetry.

To repeat—your first impression is that Frank Lausche lacks political moxie, that vague something that puts a pitcher in the big leagues, a ham in the movies and a handshaker in office. The impression is dead wrong. This man looms as the Democratic political sensation of the year.

The Republican Party leaders are naturally assuming this summer that the state of Ohio will cast its 25 electoral votes for the Republican opponent of Mr. Roosevelt, and bring to an end that aberration which has driven its citizens to vote for FDR three times running. The Governor, the two United States Senators, and 20 of the state's 23 Representatives in Congress are Republican, so this assumption, on the face of things, would seem reasonable.

But Roosevelt may well carry Ohio again in 1944, and Mayor Lausche of Cleveland, who is the Democratic candidate for Governor, may well be the man to do it for him. Lausche is developing a fabulous reputation for getting people to vote for him, regardless of party and without benefit of machine organization.

Lausche is a modest man. He discounts his own importance to the President's political chances in Ohio, and says that the President has more strength in the state than has been conceded to him. But the Mayor's own recent record for popularity at the polls is the best measure of his value in Ohio to a national Democratic ticket headed by Mr. Roosevelt. In 1941, after a creditable service of six years as a judge of the Court of Common Pleas (in which he took the initiative in cleaning organized gambling out of Cuyahoga County, the metropolitan district of Cleveland) and without official backing from the local Democratic machine, Lausche ran for Mayor and received 50,300, or 59 percent, of the votes cast. In this city of spectacular municipal election contests, Lausche's first election set a record both in the number and percentage of votes cast for him. In November, 1943, he was reëlected by a total of 67,900, or 71 percent of the votes cast. Rarely in history has an American city given such a generous endorsement to the work of its chief executive.

Early this spring, with one day left before the deadline for the filing of nominations for state office, Lausche told a couple of City Hall reporters (who swear by him loyally) that he thought he would run for Governor. He filed, and became one of five candi-

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dates for the Democratic nomination. One of his Democratic opponents was Martin Sweeney, the former anti-New Deal Representative from Cleveland who was repudiated by the voters in 1942. Lausche's campaign for the nomination was brief. He packed a satchel and spent ten or eleven days downstate, where the river counties once dominated by the Ku Klux Klan might have been expected to pay little attention to a second-generation Slav from polyglot Cleveland. The professional politicians and seers said that Lausche couldn't possibly win the nomination for Governor. To begin with, they said, he had an unpronounceable name. (It's pronounced Low-shuh.) But Lausche swept the primary, receiving 179,000 of the 300,000 votes cast, considerably more than all the other candidates combined.

Lausche made his sensational primary race without a penny or word of support from the regular Democratic organization, either in Cleveland or downstate. Ray T. Miller, Democratic chairman of Cuyahoga County, greeted Lausche's ambition to be Governor with a chill silence, and while supporting no other candidate, restrained some of his enthusiastic underlings from climbing on the Lausche bandwagon. (After three years of a Democratic city administration, County Chairman Miller has no more standing at the City Hall than any other citizen. He and Mayor Lausche maintain a definitely cool nodding acquaintance.)

After his downstate campaign trip of a week and a half in the recent primary, Mayor Lausche remitted to the City Treasurer of Cleveland a check for $416.62, representing the amount of his salary ($15,000 annually) for the period that he was away from his duties as Mayor. At first hand, this gesture seems a little bit too pious, an obvious attempt to suggest to the voters of Ohio that their current Governor, Mr. Bricker, before Chicago traveled a lot on their time to keep alive his slender chances for the Republican nomination for President. But the newspapermen around a politician are not fooled (very often). Any newspaperman in Cleveland, reporter or editor, will indignantly refute any imputation that the Mayor's remission of unearned salary was a political gesture. They will insist with some heat that there is not the slightest tinge of insincerity in this paragon of civic virtue. Such newspaper support as Mayor Lausche enjoys doesn't often come the way of a public official. Indeed, one of Cleveland's three papers, The News, criticized Lausche's decision to run for Governor on the ground that he was too valuable to be spared from his job as Mayor.

What is this charm which has captivated 71 out of every 100 of Cleveland's voters, which promises to put Lausche in the Governor's office at Columbus, and at the same time swing this mother of Republican Presidents into the Democratic column again for a fourth term?

It consists, I believe, of a personal honesty and simplicity which do not need exposition by a press agent to persuade voters who have seen, met or heard Frank Lausche. His Republican opponent for Governor, Mayor James G. Stewart of Cincinnati, a slick machine politician and handshaker, who is being presented to the voters by Ed Schorr, the Republican boss of Cincinnati, may have some little trouble combating Lausche's honest directness.

Lausche says things that coming from any other man would be pure corn. But in visiting him, you feel—and it is demonstrably true that Ohio voters feel—that the threadbare cliché of the hack politician somehow or other assumes the aspect of truth and clarity when it is emitted by Lausche. "The man who serves his country best serves his party best," the Mayor said gravely during my visit. And again: "The methods of the political bosses in rendering public service are not in accord with mine. They believe in the party first and the country second, and they believe they constitute the party." I suspect that things like this ring true from Lausche because he means them.

Lausche has the almost unanimous support of labor unions in Cleveland, but is not formally a "labor candidate." As a judge he once enjoined "stranger picketing," a principle that has since been reversed by the United States Supreme Court (in a later case; Lausche's decision was upheld by the Supreme Court). In his efficient conduct of the city of Cleveland's affairs, Lausche takes pride in the universality of the groups which formally support him—organized labor, organized business and the organized professions.

Lausche ventures the guess, without seeming immodest, that the citizens of Cleveland feel that he plays no favorites in the conduct of public affairs. He will take no campaign contributions from anyone who, later on, might conceivably have business with the city or the state. Last October, a few weeks before his second election, the City Council, yielding to AFL pressure, granted an increase in the pay of building craftsmen employed by the city from $1.62½ to $1.72½ per hour. The Mayor was convinced that since the city building workers had full-time employment, they were not entitled to the same rate as the private craftsmen who suffered seasonal losses in their work. Despite

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warnings that he would be a "dead duck" politically, he vetoed the pay increase. While the building tradesmen attacked him bitterly for "penny pinching," the rest of labor was unswerving in its support, as the election of November, 1943, proved. Meanwhile, Lausche had been generous with pay increases to charwomen and other low-paid city employees.

"It was a matter of conscience," Lausche says, recalling the turmoil of his veto of the building-trades pay increase. "But I'm convinced if you go along doing what you think is right the people will believe in you."

We will hear more of Mayor Lausche. His reputation seems destined to expand beyond the confines of his native Ohio.

EDWIN A. LAHEY

Prosperity After the War

II. *The Role of War Savings*

THE CHIEF ADDITION to the economic landscape of postwar America will be in new and practically inexhaustible commercial outlets which did not exist before the war. I do not speak of foreign markets; in the long run, the outlets for American products abroad will be restricted by the willingness of the United States to import foreign goods. Without minimizing the American share in the reconstruction of Russia and the industrialization of China and India, it should be recognized that the balance of an economic system which controls more than half the wealth of the world cannot be obtained by exports. It must be based on its own domestic markets, and the smooth expansion of our economy assumes a continuous improvement of our standard of living.

This is where war savings come into the picture. By the end of the war the nation will possess a possible $250 billion in savings and liquid reserves—several times the amount of its prewar annual income. Savings will be widely distributed: $20 billion or more in the hands of farmers, and the equivalent of some two years' prewar earnings in the hands of millions of workers' families. As the result of lack of time and opportunity for spending, scarcity of certain goods, uncertainties in the personal situation of millions of families and the more austere general manner of living during the war, these savings are being put aside—not for a rainy day, but for the bright day after victory.

The return of the war savings and reserves to circulation will be accelerated by the deferred demand of individuals for durable goods and demands of business for capital goods. Measured by prewar scales, this deferred demand can be met in a few years, part of it during the final stage of the war. It will absorb only a small fraction of war savings, and after it has been met, about 25 million families will still hold reserves for individual security and claim the higher standards of living to which these holdings entitle them.

Precipitous liquidation of savings before large-scale production of civilian goods is resumed would cause considerable losses to savers and make disastrous economic dislocations imminent.

In fact, if after the end of hostilities the nation tried to spend monthly $10 billion more than its current monthly income, prices would skyrocket at a rate unheard of during the war. This would curtail the real value of the outstanding savings; the fear of their further depreciation would stimulate a race of spending and an inflationary spiral would develop. Without overlooking the danger of this aftermath of accumulation of war savings, it should be recognized that this is not the most probable course of events. There is in fact no indication that a great majority of the population intends to liquidate their savings immediately after the war. Nationwide surveys taken by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States and the National Planning Association as well as numerous local inquiries, suggest rather that most of the holders of war savings have definite plans for their utilization after the war is over. These plans range from purchasing cars and refrigerators to buying houses, improving present homes, sending children to college and the like. Some dream of long vacations and travel, others intend to keep their savings as a reserve for individual security, still others think of investments in independent business.

The fact that war savings are distributed so widely among all groups of the population increases the likelihood of their gradual liquidation stretching over a considerable period of time. Of course, the situation may change if a runaway inflation develops as the result of a precipitate repeal of price control or shortsighted tax, credit and monetary policies. In this event, many holders of war savings would forget their present intentions and try to get rid of their money as soon as possible.

All in all, war savings would increase the disastrous consequences of postwar inflation if an inflationary rise of prices develops, but it is not very likely that a runaway inflation would result from the propensity of holders of war savings to spend them immediately after the end of hostilities. A smooth reconversion demands, therefore, a policy which strengthens the confidence of the public in the national currency. If

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savings return to circulation gradually, they may ward off deflation, stimulate production and investment and support a high level of employment for a long time.

The question may arise as to what assurance we have that people will spend their savings after the war rather than keep them as individual security for old age, sickness or unemployment. The anticipation of gradual liquidation of war savings is based essentially on what holders of these savings told interviewers in numerous surveys on their postwar plans. It is recognized that liquidation of war savings would be slowed down by fears of major depression and unemployment after the end of hostilities. A universal strike of spending is, however, rather unlikely. Some people will fear for their jobs, others will feel more or less secure. A few will be ready to spend their money without regard for what is coming next.

It should be borne in mind that new demands and new outlets after the war by no means necessitate that all savers spend all their stored purchasing power. They postulate only that *some* of the holders of war savings make use of a *part* of their reserves. How large should this part be?

Let us assume that because of the universal fear of approaching depression, four out of five holders of war savings make no use of their reserve purchasing power, while the fifth, out of five, spends only 20 percent of his savings annually. Under this assumption, which seems to be extremely conservative, four percent of aggregate war savings would return into circulation each year. This would imply an injection into the economic system of an additional purchasing power of approximately $10 billion annually, which is more than might be effected by a liberal program of public works.

Without denying the possibility of a large part of war savings being frozen for a long time after the war, these considerations suggest that at least a fraction of the stored purchasing power will flow back into circulation and serve as a defense of the economic system against deflationary setbacks.

How long may this system work and what is likely to happen to production and employment after the war savings are spent?

There is no adequate ground for assuming any specific timetable in future spending of war savings. Some savings will probably be spent in the first two or three years after the end of the war, others will return into circulation a decade or two later, others will affect the behavior of holders only indirectly, ensuring their feeling of security. Actually a fund of $250 billion cannot be added to current earnings and spent in a decade without provoking inflationary dislocations. The nation will be facing a dilemma: either it will dissipate its war savings by means of inflation, speculation on the stock exchange and the like, or these savings will be assimilated by the economic system and exercise a lasting influence on economic conditions, marking to some extent the beginning of a new era in the economic history of the nation.

The form in which war savings have been put aside will favor the extension of spending over a comparatively long period of time. People who have bought war bonds will forget that they had paid $75 for each $100 bond and will therefore feel that they are losing money as long as they cannot cash a bond for its maturity value. The psychological inducement to wait for the maturity of the bond may be much stronger than the interests accruing in the respective years.

The economic scene in the transition period will be favorable to the injection of purchasing power without inflationary implications. But this operation cannot be repeated indefinitely. Expansion of production not only means increased output but also increased purchasing power for the population. The spending of war savings may therefore act as an equalizing device, preventing deflationary effects of oversaving in other sections of the economic system almost indefinitely. Moreover, accruing interest will offset, at least to some extent, the expenditures financed from this fund.

In the first two or three years after the end of hostilities, war savings will flow to durable goods (cars, washing machines of tomorrow, refrigerators, miracle-kitchens and the like). The impact of savings on the construction industry may last 10 to 20 years: wartime savings may stimulate the rebuilding of rural America, and slum clearance, rezoning and development of residential sections around airfields in metropolitan areas. The major and most lasting effect of war savings on economic conditions in postwar America will probably be a new pattern of peacetime spending and saving. Some 20 million families, thanks to war savings, may be inclined to use their current earnings more freely, and their spending may check the tendency toward oversaving which many students hold responsible for deflationary phenomena in the 1930's.

This article does not propose that the fantastic accumulation of savings in America (we are putting aside annually more than the value of the total national production of prewar Germany or Great Britain) is a panacea against all evils. It stresses, rather, the crucial importance of this *new factor* for the future economic development of the United States. Were it not for war savings, the chance of full employment in postwar America, without fundamental changes in the economic system, would be rather slim. The new factor gives a new opportunity. To make use of this opportunity, encouraging savings during the war and promoting their *gradual* flow back into circulation thereafter should become the guiding principle of our economic policy.

W. S. WOYTINSKY

This is the second of two articles. – THE EDITORS

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Washington Notes

The Fight for Second Place

LIBERAL FORCES in the Democratic Party almost won their fight for the renomination of Henry A. Wallace. The Vice President himself came through the battle with increased prestige. He won a tremendous moral victory. As one person put it, President Roosevelt forced Wallace on the convention in 1940; in 1944 the people almost forced Wallace on the President. The people wanted Wallace. All the polls showed that. The convention crowds wanted Wallace. The demonstrations for him were tremendous and spontaneous despite the unfriendly reception from the convention management.

But the party bosses did not want Wallace. Conservatives in the party, North and South, were against him. Robert E. Hannegan, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was against Wallace and had been campaigning against him for months. Finally, the stop-Wallace movement had the support, the blessing and the coöperation of President Roosevelt. Yet Wallace almost defeated the entire combination. He received more votes on the first ballot than his friends had predicted. At his highest point he had 40 percent of the vote.

The day before the balloting on the vice presidency, Wallace made one of the finest speeches of his life. It angered and frightened the reactionaries who were fighting to reëstablish themselves in the seats of the mighty. The speech was not intended to appease. It was a courageous, fighting speech of an honest man. It was not the speech of a politician, but it contained the soundest advice the politicians received. If the Democratic Party wants to win, he said, it must be the liberal party. The Republicans are better conservatives. "Democrats who try to play the Republican game inside the Democratic Party always find that it just can't work on a national scale." Republicans who try to play the liberal game in the Republican Party can't win, either. "I know because my father tried it. Perhaps Wendell Willkie may have learned in 1944 a little of that which my own father learned in 1924."

The warning went unheard. The middle-of-the-roaders, the idea-less men, were on the road to victory. They were out to defeat the fightingest New Dealer in high position. But it took the help of the President to make the defeat certain. Why the President did what he did is beyond explanation at this time. Some day, perhaps, his motives may be better known. Many theories have been advanced, but the only one that sounds plausible now is that he wanted to be reëlected and thought Wallace would hurt his chances. Mr. Roosevelt is a superb politician, and politicians are not always candid. The President was not candid with the American people or with the Democratic convention.

He wrote that if he were a delegate he would vote for Henry Wallace. Yet before that was written he told Hannegan that he preferred Truman to Wallace. And throughout the convention the weight of his influence was against Wallace. The letter expressing his preference for Wallace hurt the Vice President's chances, and it was so intended. Wallace knew that. He knew that Mr. Roosevelt had not been aboveboard. Despite that, Wallace would have withdrawn if the President had made the request. But the President lacked the heart or the courage to ask Wallace to quit. I heard no defense of the President.

Hannegan's action was on a par with the President's. On July 18, the day before the convention met—note the date—Hannegan let it be known that he had a letter from the President saying that he would be happy to have Truman on the ticket and that he believed Truman would add real strength to the ticket. That letter caused explosions all over the city. The President had never said as much for Wallace, and everyone immediately knew that it was the tip-off. It was an endorsement of Truman as the President's first choice. When Barkley heard of the letter, he was furious. We already had the text of his speech putting the President's name in nomination, but he recalled it and told his friends that he would never make it. He was finally persuaded to change his mind and the speech was reissued. Byrnes also was furious. On July 19, he released a letter to Senator Maybank announcing his withdrawal from the race in deference to the wishes of the President. Byrnes told his friends that he would resign as director of the Office of War Mobilization. But he probably will not, because of party loyalty, and because he cannot quit that kind of job in wartime.

In the Wallace camp the letter also brought an immediate reaction. Senators Pepper and Guffey accused Hannegan of acting in bad faith and of not releasing the entire letter. On July 20, the pressure was so great, and the reaction in Wallace's favor was so disturbing to the bosses, that Hannegan called a press conference and read the letter. It was dated July 19. He never explained how he happened to have had it on July 18. When the press conference was over, newspapermen left holding their noses, and Hannegan looked pretty sick.

Poor Harry Truman. And poor people of the United States. Truman and the people are the ones who will suffer from that convention deal between Roosevelt and the bosses. Truman is a nice man, an honest man, a good Senator, a man of great humility and a man of courage. He will make a passable Vice President. But Truman as President of the United States in times like these? He told a senatorial colleague a few days before he was nominated that the thought terrified him. It terrifies me, too.

Strangely enough, Truman is not expected to add any particular strength to the ticket, except in Missouri, which has been in the doubtful Democratic column this year.

There is nothing brilliant about Harry Truman. Though he is distinguished neither in mind nor attainments, he has real character. Nothing in his habit or demeanor makes him stand out in a crowd. He is not a great leader, but he wins friends easily and he speaks the language of practical men. Without pretension and without great astuteness he has examined witnesses and worked long hours to make the Senate Committee which bears his name one of the most valuable in Congress.

Chicago T. R. B.

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The Water's Fine

MR. SKEFFINGTON" is a hollow kind of film on which Bette Davis, the makeup and costume departments, and Director Vincent Sherman have ganged up to do some excellent things. The film records the career of a great, cold, narcissistic beauty of the early 1900's named Fanny, who lived in New York and was beautiful up to the age of about sixty-five, whereupon she became ferociously ugly. Her ugliness is hobgoblinish and mask-like, but the above individuals and departments have created a spectacularly beautiful woman for the prettier part of her life, and have done a diverting job of showing her change in styles and fashion from period to period. Miss Davis transforms herself with great effect into a girlish, tantalizing prettiness with a high petulant voice that is the best part of the portrait, and then for some reason drops completely back into her old stereotyped self—with the hitched walk, the dance-like business with her arms and hands and the heavy, hysterical voice—for the latter part of the film. "Mr. Skeffington" is dominantly dependent for its interest and suspense on the physical change of its people over a period of time, and to a lesser degree on how they looked and acted in particular events of the time, and it shows an unusual talent for doing this.

It is a good family album, but something less as a movie about Fanny and her Jewish husband, Mr. Skeffington, who masochistically stands by while she collects a horde of admirers, and finally gets the love he has patiently waited for when she is sixty-odd and has grown as ugly as she deserved. It is a meager, somewhat frivolous sketch of their lives, showing you the comic-opera exits and entrances of the various male admirers into the Skeffington mansion, and brief, unimportant chats whose main purpose is to get across some comical lines. You are teased with the idea of a love affair between Fanny and her brother, and the problem of a daughter who has a Jewish father and a Gentile mother, and you are illuminated almost not at all about either fact, just as you are left in a rather suggestive fog about everything else concerning the Skeffingtons.

For all but its last half-reel, the swimming-pool epic called "Bathing Beauty" is a mild entertainment composed of Red Skelton's antics, the kind of situations that usually come up in movies in which a man is caught in a girls' school, and music by a woman named Ellen Smith, who plays quick, corny whirling noises on the organ, and music like Muzak by Harry James and Xavier Cugat's symphony-sized orchestras. At the end, though, there is one of those spectacular chorus numbers, which is performed in its most difficult medium so far, a swimming pool the size of a a stadium where the usual human cartwheels, flower designs, and fountains in the number are made with amazing facility, with no difference at all from the way they are made on land. Then Esther Williams does a wonderful interpretation of under-water ecstasy that is the most aesthetic swimming I have ever seen. The only mediums left to be conquered by the dance directors of Hollywood after this water ballet are lava and quicksand, and I don't think they will be any more difficult than swimming-pool water.

The people who play in another musical, "And the Angels Sing," are bright and brassy enough, the spirit of the piece confident enough that it is the greatest all-out farce in years, and the situations promising enough to cause you only surprise and a mild let-down at the repeated thuds the picture makes. A typical kind of gag is that four people in succession (one of the troubles is that everything is done four times because there are four sisters who are heroines) will walk up to a violently steaming kettle, burn their fingers lifting its lid, and squeal in exactly the same way; not until the third person has done this will you believe that the kettle business is intended as a major gag, and that nothing funnier is going to be done with it, because you have been so taken in by the deceptive brightness. The people in it—like Betty Hutton, Diana Lynn and Raymond Walburn, its desire to jump on anything for a laugh, and the environments it chooses for jumping, remind you enough of Preston Sturgis' pictures to make you expect about the same returns. The only places you get them nearly equally are those in which Betty Hutton is allowed to explode to her best capacities. As a human flywheel she produces almost as much emotional effect as she puts in the performance.

MANNY FARBER

The Bandwagon

Eight hundred villagers of Oradour-sur-Glane, in the department of Haute Vienne in central France, were massacred by SS troops "in error." . . . "The punitive expedition was really directed against Oradour-sur-Vayres, a bigger place some 17 miles away," the German official is quoted as saying. – *From PM.*

Every American mother's right to dream of her son in the White House will be lost if President Roosevelt is allowed a fourth term, Republican lawyer Horace H. Appel, sponsor of a national Anti-Fourth Term Committee, said today. – *UP dispatch to The Santa Monica (Calif.) Evening Outlook.*

Hillman group's approval may be handicap to office-seekers, Gallup poll indicates.

The CIO-indorsed candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor, Mayor Maurice J. Tobin of Boston, tonight took a 2-to-1 lead over State Treasurer Francis X. Hurley, outspoken critic of the New Deal. – *From adjoining columns on the first page of The Washington Post.*

Brave New World

MEN WHO PLAN BEYOND TOMORROW
PREFER THE WORLD'S LIGHTEST HIGHBALL!

– *An advertisement of Seagram's in The United States News.*

And Get a Slap in the Puss

The best way of establishing the right friendly relations with a cow is to approach her as if she were a human being. Walk up from the right rear, place the left hand on her hip and say, "So, Bossie." – *From The Bulletin for Dairy Workers.*

Kamerad!

German officers in a prison camp in southern England were revealed to have petitioned the commandant for immediate removal to another section of England after a robot bomb landed nearby recently. – *The San Francisco News.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

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Correspondence

International Wage Level the Key to Peace

SIR: Your editorial, "The Monetary Isolationists" [The New Republic, July 3], meets with my entire approval. However, I should like to bring one question to your attention, namely, whether the international exchange problem is not a secondary issue at best. For money, after all, is merely a medium of exchange; the reality underlying it is the exchange of goods, and this depends upon the respective wage levels of the different countries. It seems to me therefore that this whole problem should not be considered apart from an adjustment of the international wage level. This is in the last analysis not an economic but a general social issue. We cannot arrive at genuine international understanding without first having ironed out our internal disputes concerning management-labor relationships, and the relationship between industry and farming. And these must be regulated on the basis of principle.

Claremont, Calif. F. WERTGEN

"The Condition of Man"

SIR: What is the main purpose of a book review? Is it to give the reader a clear idea of the main themes of a book and the competence of the author to deal with his subject matter? Or is it rather an occasion for the critic to display the resources of his learned and philosophic mind? After reading Mr. Lebowitz's review of Lewis Mumford's "The Condition of Man" in your issue of June 26, it seems to one of your readers that your critic is too much interested in Mr. Lebowitz's philosophic views to deal either clearly or appreciatively with the author's book. What, for instance, can be the value to the reader, wishing to know somewhat of the value of the book, to be told that:

> The biological concept of function brings the phenomena of sentience and symbolization within the purview of experimental analysis, and thus, far from invalidating or detracting from the traditional notion of causality, actually refines it and gives it an extra dimension.

But what most stirs me to wish that your critic had given more attention to the book and less to intellectual and philosophic casuistry is his declaration that "the *central weakness* of Mr. Mumford's book is that he persistently raises yet never examines the delicate question of the therapeutic value of history," etc. (Italics mine.)

Isn't it pretty late in the afternoon of the race to begin now to raise the question of the value of history? What is the value of experience to me or to the race? What is the value to a jurist of a knowledge of the facts? What is the value of the news? These are all history made or in the making. The professional doubter can spend his whole life, if he chooses, questioning all that is human, and end as he began, with questioning. But I challenge his right to ask that Mr. Mumford or anyone else so spend his time.

Actually, Mr. Mumford does vindicate the value of the history with which he is concerned, the history of spiritual ideas and ideals, by his concise, illuminating summaries of the central core of the truth, that part of their teachings that mankind has retained because experience has proved its value, by which Plato, Jesus, St. Francis, Loyola, Calvin, Fourier, Marx and many another personality of the first order has placed man in debt to each of them. The reader who has lingered over Mr. Mumford's pages feels his spirit quickened, his mind stirred, his consciousness of the value of ideals confirmed, to a degree that is itself the best proof of the value of such study of history.

I dare say that Mr. Lebowitz himself has his moments—in the bath, or at the lunch counter—when he is not a philosopher but just plain man. In such moments, I feel certain that he has no more doubt of the value of history than he has that he gets nourishment from food, or cleansing from his bath. Why, then, insist that a book which is not a philosophic treatise should begin by "examining the therapeutic value of history"?

The next time you come across a first-rate book, of the stature of "The Condition of Man," please, please give it to someone for review who hasn't let his philosophic doubts and concepts crowd out his appreciation of a book that challenges so persuasively the prevailing materialistic tendencies of our time, that makes us aware as does no other of the peril of our age, our neglect of the primacy of man, with his spirit largely submerged in his material tasks, engrossed in eagerness to accumulate material goods, more machines and bigger cities.

Spokane, Wash. B. H. KIZER

Fascism Still a Threat

SIR: In the editorial "The End of the German Myth" in the June 19 issue is one statement with which I definitely disagree. It is: "With the death of the Nazi myth of invincibility, fascism itself died in this world." What about Franco? Is he suddenly non-fascist only because it has been proved that the Nazis are not invincible? What about the fascist-minded people in the Argentine neighbor of ours or those in several of the exiled governments of some European countries? What about the fascist forces in those countries which call themselves democracies, here in our own United States of America, for example? Yes, there are fascist forces in this world! They are alive and growing and sinister and hidden under the neat cloak of respectability, but they *are present* and we *must* fight them!

Minneapolis, Minn. MRS. MARJORIE L. SWENSON

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Carolyn Lehman Goldberg, of Durham, North Carolina, writes to us concerning an Institute on Race Relations held recently at the North Carolina College for Negroes. State leaders, both white and colored, met together to discuss North Carolina race problems. Our correspondent, however, points out the ironic fact that the shooting of a Negro soldier by a Durham bus driver occurred while the Institute was in process.

A Chicago reader, Chauncy S. Curtis, suggests that Great Britain's announcement in a recent White Paper that depressions are not necessary and will no longer be allowed to occur, be given the widest possible publicity. The announcement was reported in "British Isles and Bretton Woods" [The New Republic, July 3]. Mr. Curtis says this declaration that "human rights are to be placed ahead of property rights" could be used to "fire the imagination and hopes" of so many people that "a real change in our social order could be demanded . . . and finally accomplished—with a minimum of turmoil."

New Republic readers in the New York area may be interested to learn of an organization, "The New York Enthusiasts," which provides lectures and other cultural and recreational activities, mainly for recent citizens and immigrants from various European countries. The director of the group is Hans Hacker, 604 Riverside Drive, New York City 31.

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Books in Review

The World of Sumner Welles

MOST AUTHORS set down in their writings more than they know: it is in the nature of a diplomat to set down a good deal less. Sumner Welles is an accomplished and urbane diplomat, but he has not held back very much in his new book.[1] I say "new" because Welles is a writing diplomat, having once written a big book called "Naboth's Vineyard," which previsioned our good-neighbor policy. For a time he was too busy to write. But having found Cordell Hull anything but a good neighbor in the State Department he was, as you remember, ousted from it last year. Like a Cicero retiring to his villa and his books when the great ones of Rome had no place for him in their councils, or a Machiavelli mulling over in bitter seclusion the meaning of his diplomatic experiences, Welles has written a rich, crowded, reflective book about the commonwealths and the princes of our time.

Let me—since I shall be harsh about some specific ideas of Welles—start by saying flatly that his book as a whole is first-rate. Some will want to read it for its diplomatic "revelations," some for its detailed history, some for its program for a new world structure, some for its somber prophetic note. Any way you look at it, it is a tragic business—this story by a diplomat of the blunderings of diplomats, this urbane and dignified *cri de coeur* from a man who has sat in the councils of the mighty and knows what they think and plan. Welles has given us his fears, hopes, plans and warnings. He deserves our attention.

Let me set down in summary form his more important positions and propositions. Welles has been classed as a Wilsonian, and I suppose that in his emphasis on the structure of a postwar revised League, he is. Yet he sees Versailles as a tangle of errors, the most serious being these: the failure to forge the Covenant of the League during the war, when it might have become part of our habits of thought rather than afterwards; the failure to provide for a continuing Allied control over German armaments; the effort at once to crush and to ignore the new Russian state created by the Revolution and to keep it out of world councils. Despite these failures of Versailles, the Second World War might still have been avoided had the democracies followed a realistic foreign policy in the interval, instead of being bemused between Hitler's double-talk and their fear of Russia. President Roosevelt, says Welles, was almost alone among the democratic leaders in knowing what the score was. Welles's own mission to the belligerents in 1940, which carried him to Rome, Berlin, Paris and London, was an honest effort by the President to canvass the possibilities of peace, and to face what seemed to him the inevitable suction of America into the war with the conviction that he had left nothing undone to avoid it. From then until Pearl Harbor, the President pursued a bold policy of aiding the Allies, notably in the destroyers-bases agreement, the Lend-Lease Act and the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter.

So much for history, in narrating which Welles works hard but is not adept. He is better when he lays out the world's thorny regional problems: Item, that the good-neighbor policy elaborated at Buenos Aires and Rio de Janeiro and tested during the present war, is a system of regionalism which "must be an indispensible part of any international organization after the war." Item, that the problem of the Balkans and Eastern Europe and the Near East is not a problem for manipulative diplomacy but one of lifting depressed living standards; that only an economic union or several of them among these peoples will solve their problem—despite the Soviet Union's hostility to any federative order in that area not under its influence; and that the best solution in the Near East is the abandonment of the British mandate in Palestine, to be replaced by a Jewish-Arab autonomous state within a Near Eastern federative system. Item, that the solution in the Far East lies in applying the international-trusteeship principle to Korea, Burma, Malaya, French Indo-China and the island peoples of the Southwestern Pacific, with India and the Dutch empire being granted some form of freedom or autonomy in accordance with commitments already made by Great Britain and Holland. Item, that "the German menace" can be ended if the Allies adopt a policy of continuing control over German armaments and the German economy, if Central Europe's communications and power development are internationalized, if Germany is politically partitioned, and if a world organization is created within which the Germans, thus controlled, policed and cut up, can move toward a decent partnership with other nations.

Finally, Welles's plan for a world organization, which he maps out in greater detail than I can give here. Structurally, it is an excellent plan. It consists of an over-all United Nations Executive Council, a World Court, a World Congress, and a Securities and Armaments Commission. The Council is dominated by the four Great Powers as the heads of their respective regions. Each region will decide for itself how it will make force available to keep the peace in its area. The world organization as such would invoke force only when the regional system had failed to settle the controversy. And even then any one of the Great Powers can exercise a sort of *liberum veto* as in the Polish Diet: their unanimous consent is necessary if force is to be used.

Most of these are liberal and creditable attitudes. But I judge a man's views on foreign policy less by his large generalizations and plans than by the way he applies them to the living questions of our time.

There are five major questions today that I use as my touchstones for Welles's thinking.

The first is policy toward Russia. Welles has learned from the failures of our Russian policy a quarter-century

[1] **The Time for Decision, by Sumner Welles. New York: Harper and Brothers. 431 pages. $3.**

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ago—and as a diplomat he has a healthy respect for power and the *fait accompli*. None the less, his view that Russia has a right to get the frontiers she needs for her essential security is a fresh view for an American diplomat. So also is his view that Russia has a right to create a system of federal regionalism in Eastern Europe, much like our system of regionalism in Latin America—but Welles adds the somewhat wistful warning that it must consist of independent sovereign states, as ours does. When a realistic diplomat confronts a massive power, warnings like this tend to become literary flourishes.

The second touchstone: our Spanish policy. Welles regards the American embargo on munitions to Loyalist Spain during the civil war as "the greatest error in the foreign policy of this country during the past twelve years." I agree. I would add that it was a moral humiliation as well as a political blunder. I am all the more dismayed therefore to find Welles complacently going along with the administration's policy toward the Franco regime on the ground of "military expediency." That causes me to reëxamine Welles's original view, and I find that the reason he considers our policy during the Spanish civil war a blunder is that "had the Republican government survived, Italy would have been less likely to have entered the war against France." Nothing here about the demoralization of democratic feeling because of the tragic outcome of the Spanish conflict. Nothing about how that outcome emboldened Hitler to strike at Czecho-Slovakia and heartened fascists all over the world. Nothing about how it meant an overwhelming wave of Falangist poison pouring into America to the South, befouling the winds of good-neighbor doctrine. Only a narrow "military expediency," condemning a bad policy in one instance, approving of it in the other.

The third touchstone: our French policy. Like the rest of us Welles is sad about the fall of the French republic. But while he mourns the Fall he does not celebrate the Resurrection. He agrees with the Vichyism of the early phase of our post-Republic policy and the Darlanism of the middle phase—again on the ground of "military expediency." I find nothing in his whole account of our French policy which might not have been signed by Hull or Leahy or Robert Murphy. Nor do I find the basic understanding that when American policy resists the emergence of the Provisional Government it is the surest way to throw the French Left into de Gaulle's arms and to develop therefore what latent dictatorial impulses he has.

The fourth touchstone: our proposed policy toward Germany. Welles feels that, to kill German militarism, we must partition Germany into three states. Here he is in a debatable area whose outlines have not yet clearly formed. Yet it is significant that the man who sees retrospectively that there may have been hope in the revolutionary German socialist of a quarter-century ago, Karl Liebknecht, has no hope for the revolutionary German socialists of tomorrow; and that when confronted by a really tough problem in social dynamics he should fall back on the mechanical method of partition.

The final touchstone: our policy with respect to Argentina. Welles regards non-recognition as having given the ultra-nationalist Argentinian groups a handy weapon to use in solidifying anti-American feeling. He considers it an integral part of the good-neighbor policy that we should recognize the government of Argentina, however fascist and however closely identified with our enemies.

It will thus be readily seen how great a gap there is between a liberal credo and its application to concrete situations. It will not console the Spanish patriots or the de Gaullists or the German Socialists or the Argentinian democrats to tell them that Sumner Welles has an excellent world plan. The faults of Sumner Welles's foreign policy are the faults of the whole school of thought, whether administration or liberal Republican, which laments the sordid past and limns a new and "revolutionary" world future, but cannot bother to apply either the sense of tragedy or the analysis of revolution to the living realities of the present.

"The people of this country," writes Welles in a moving peroration, "should learn that the world revolution is not something they need dread, but rather something that can be made to redound to their own benefit. The world revolution is already here." Excellent. Is that why we have been doing business with Franco? Welles's answer is that "ideology" must give way to "military expediency." But I should have thought it the task of clear thinking in foreign policy to guide the military mind rather than be guided by it. A revolutionary situation, if exploited, may be worth twenty divisions. If foreign policy is to be surrendered to the generals, then the State Department might as well be run by them.

I fear that Welles's talk of world revolution is surface stuff, not yet integrated with his thinking on foreign policy. The former sounds like talk to me, but the latter seems almost in the nature of a tropism.

I think a similar analysis can be made of Welles's views on the crucial concept of good-neighbor regionalism. Welles once asked us, in a moving speech after his resignation from the State Department, to adopt Carlyle's injunction and to "handle the rotten roughly." I still think that was a good injunction. I should like to see it applied as much to fascism in Argentina as to fascism in Spain or Germany. Mr. Welles is not always against the use of non-recognition as an instrument. He feels deeply that we were right to use it in the case of the non-recognition of territories taken by the fascist force of Germany and Italy. But while he wants to apply it to territories taken by force, he is against applying it to governments taken by force. And yet the latter is just as dangerous to world peace—more dangerous if the force that is used is fascist force—than even territorial expansion. A realist diplomacy such as the Russian understands this. That is why the Russians are more concerned with the ideologies of the Polish Government-in-Exile than they are with Russian-Polish boundary questions to which Mr. Welles devotes his attention in discussing the Polish problem. For fascism in itself spells aggression, and a fascist government is always a prelude to intrigue and conspiracy, to expansion and war. This is the great diplomatic reality of our time.

This does not mean that the way to deal with a fascist government on our continent is to make war on it. I agree with Welles that our real instrument should be the good-neighbor policy. I agree with him that non-recognition cannot in itself solve the problem that our fascist Argentinian neighbor poses for us. But neither can non-interven-

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tion. I am troubled because in his long analysis of our good-neighbor policy he rarely cuts beneath the surface of urbanity, regional good will and economic aid. More is required of a good-neighbor policy than *laissez-faire* plus Lend-Lease. The problem that Argentina poses can be met only by a militant solidarity of the Americas based on common aims, common ideas, common democratic standards. The President's quarantine speech of 1937, then applied to Germany, is just as valid when applied to Argentina. It may already have been too late then to apply it on our own continent.

I agree with Welles that the State Department is bungling the Argentinian question. I go further and say that this may become the great diplomatic disaster of the 1940's. But I do not believe that the recognition of the Argentinian government will help. Neither recognition in itself nor non-recognition in itself is enough. Non-recognition is an instrument that has meaning only within a positive effort to organize the revolutionary democratic energies of the whole continent so that the fascist wave of Argentina breaks against the stone wall of that purpose.

MAX LERNER

Body and Mind

Psychosomatic Diagnosis, by Flanders Dunbar. New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc. 741 pages. $7.50.

PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE—as has been emphasized recently by various workers in this field—is not a new medical specialty, but a new point of view. It introduces into the study of the organism and its diseases the principle of totality. The disturbed functions and, in advanced cases, the disturbed anatomical structures of the various organs cannot be adequately studied without paying attention to the complex interrelationships between the different organs and their functions. The central nervous system's main function is precisely this integration of the different functions of the organism into a functional unity.

At the present stage of our knowledge, the highest integrative functions of the organism can be best understood from the study of the total personality, since in the personality the unity of an organism comes to its most articulate manifestation. The ailments of the specific organs affect the whole personality (*vide*, for example, the traditional grouchiness of the sufferers from chronic stomach disease), but also the disturbances of the personality as a whole affect the specific functions of every organ system. Consequently every disease can and, we may add, should be studied from the psychosomatic point of view. The traditional questions of medical practice, such as what is the patient's stomach doing, what is his heart or pancreas doing, must be complemented by the question, what is the owner of these organs, Mr. Smith, doing as a human being; what are his hopes and disappointments, his marital happiness, his fears and worries? Only if these latter questions are answered in full can the ailments of Mr. Smith's heart, stomach and pancreas be satisfactorily understood and cured.

All this is convincingly demonstrated by Flanders Dunbar in her recent book, "Psychosomatic Diagnosis," which is the author's second major contribution within eight years to this new, vital field of medicine. Her first book, "Emotions and Bodily Changes"—a pioneering accomplishment—has been of invaluable service and still belongs to the standard works of modern medical literature.

That in certain diseases (such as chronic indigestion, peptic ulcers, asthma and certain nervous cardiac conditions) emotional factors play an important role has been well known for quite some time. Dunbar has consistently and courageously applied the psychosomatic approach to 1,600 unselected cases as they were admitted during the last 12 years to the Presbyterian Hospital. This book contains the careful observations made during these 12 years on patients who belonged to 7 diagnostic categories: fractures, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary occlusion, anginal syndrome, rheumatic disease, cardiac arhythmias and diabetes.

The first part of the book is devoted to methodology; it explains and by instructive examples demonstrates the technique of psychosomatic history-taking. It convincingly shows that the customary procedure of medical history-taking provides much detail concerning data immediately connected with the symptoms, but tells practically nothing about the patient as a human being. It also demonstrates that frequently just these omissions in the history pertaining to the emotionally significant events in the patient's life contain the outstanding etiological factors. Dunbar shows that in the course of the disease, aggravations and improvements which are unexplainable by the traditional medical approach need no longer be considered as *deus ex machina*, but can be easily correlated to the vicissitudes of the patient's everyday life—provided, of course, that the latter are known to the physician in the same detail as the physical symptoms. How to become informed about these details the general practitioner can learn from Dunbar's book.

Apart from such general principles, this volume of 741 pages contains a host of detailed correlations between personality traits and different diseases. From the great number of examined cases belonging to the same diagnostic groups Dunbar abstracts the common personality features characteristic of each group in the form of "personality profiles." In this part of the book the best substantiated finding is the fascinating contrast between the typical personality of the "accident-prone" fracture cases on the one hand and that of certain cardiac (particularly coronary) cases on the other. The former are impulsive, unsystematic, adventurous persons living for the present and not for the future, as do the coronary patients. They are prone to immediate action, and their main expression is action and not words and thoughts. In contrast, the most outstanding feature of the coronary patients, which they share in varying degrees with the hypertensives and angina cases, is a consistent, mostly intellectual, striving toward success. They display a highly developed rational control over behavior, the capacity to postpone and subordinate immediate actions to long-term goals. These features are most clearly found in the coronary cases; mixed with other trends, they are also present in angina patients, and are least pronounced in the hypertensives, who in general are less successful than the coronary patients.

With her detailed psychological description of coronary patients, Dunbar substantiates more precisely the well

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known observations concerning the frequency of coronary disease among persons of highly intellectual occupations, such as lawyers, physicians, ministers and executives, persons who are likely to carry heavy responsibilities and take their vocations most seriously. Like all statistical and semi-statistical findings, her observations contain relevant and secondary correlations. Until the mechanisms by which specific personality features influence the course and development of specific diseases are known in detail, the value of such correlational studies must necessarily remain limited. Why coronary patients should be so often "distinguished-looking"—as Dunbar has observed—is not quite meaningful unless one realizes that they often belong to learned occupations and often are successful in their careers. On the other hand, some of Dunbar's correlations are certainly relevant; for example, that between the "accident proneness" of fracture cases (patients who have suffered recurrent accidents) and their impulsive, adventurous and inarticulate personality.

This book, with its instructive methodological formulations, richness of observation and carefully collected statistical data, cannot fail to have a profound influence upon current medical thought and education. Moreover, for every research worker in the rapidly progressing field of psychosomatics, this book will be for many years to come a valuable source of information and inspiration.

DR. FRANZ ALEXANDER

Air Power and Peace

Wings for Peace: Labor's Postwar Policy for Civil Flying. London: The Labor Publications Department. 22 pages. Fourpence.
Freedom of the Air, by Keith Hutchison. New York: Public Affairs Pamphlets. 30 pages. 10 cents.
Keep the Peace through Air Power, by Allan A. Michie. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 196 pages. $2.

ONE of the toughest problems now facing the United Nations centers around the politics of postwar air control. Wartime advances in aircraft have outdated the old autarchic nationalisms; after the war they will require a new diplomacy. The airplane can become either civilization's greatest irenic force or its most disruptive one, depending on the air policies now gestating in official quarters.

On this issue—as on most others—informed public opinion is several jumps ahead of official action. In England, where a veritable revolution in air thinking has been brewing during recent months, the Labor Party has just come out officially for freedom of the air, regulated through international control. "Wings for Peace" represents the crystallization of an important segment of British liberal opinion. This liberal bloc believes that our present international air laws are hopelessly inadequate. Its representatives emphasize the need for a universal air code. They point out the fatal weakness of the doctrine of air sovereignty, which greatly hindered the development of air transport before the war. It is high time, they argue, to reorganize civil aviation on a scale commensurate with the airplane's vastly increased range, and with the expanded political vision of men.

"Wings for Peace" proposes a concrete plan for international nationalization of air transport. Only a bare outline of that plan can be given here. It would entail the creation of a World Air Authority, to operate "World Airways," the main trunk-lines of the world. All nations should delegate their air sovereignty to this authority, which would own all of the necessary ground organizations, in addition to providing a uniform code of air navigation and promulgating rules of safety. Trade and aircraft production would be equitably allocated among member nations. To implement this world organization, there should be regional ones. Wasteful competition in Europe, for example, would be averted through a special agency: "Europa Airways." The Labor Party also urges nationalizing Britain's air lines.

Labor spokesmen are well aware that such a far-reaching scheme may encounter insuperable opposition immediately after the war. So they also propose an interim policy, under which the World Air Authority would operate as a sort of international CAB, over a system of regional air unions. One objective of this policy would be to prevent the cartellization of air transport.

As Keith Hutchison points out in his informative pamphlet, the chances for either complete freedom of the air or a thorough internationalization of air transport appear almost negligible right now. Private companies and conservative authorities, both in England and America, only want a limited amount of air freedom. Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt have advocated nothing further than the traditional right of innocent passage. Nations are nearly certain to cling to their air sovereignty, in order to be in better bargaining positions. And despite the fact that civil aircraft is no longer suitable for most military purposes, old military fears will be long in fading.

However, the advocates of broader air freedom can find certain encouraging signs in recent news. Only a few weeks ago, Britain's Sir Frederick Handley Page—who is certainly no radical—suggested measures closely analogous to the Labor Party's interim policy. Within our State Department and the Civil Aeronautics Bureau, there seems to be a definite trend away from monopoly and toward ever greater air freedom, particularly for commercial aircraft. Since the airplane is only one instrument of economic policy, perhaps the most important long-range step toward postwar freedom of the air is being (or could be) taken at Bretton Woods.

There has been quite a lot of discussion lately about the possibilities of an air police force, to keep the peace. Allan Michie believes that the creation of such a force is the most urgent immediate task of the United Nations. His arguments are extremely provocative, and I wish I could give them greater space here. We allowed Germany to win the last peace, he contends, by returning to isolationism, disarming, and simultaneously helping Germany to rearm. Germany's entire history is a chronicle of a driving impulse toward world domination. Our real enemies are not Hitler and his party, but the German officers, Junkers and industrialists who are already laying plans for the next war. Michie defends Lord Vansittart, explodes a few "myths" concerning the Treaty of Versailles and suggests a seven-point program for Germany.

Michie, however, is no internationalist. He agrees with Walter Lippmann that international organization will evolve slowly:

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What the better world will be like will depend largely on what the victorious Allies make of it. Those who think that the coming peace will be evolved by an international conclave of all the nations, had better undeceive themselves. Anyone who believes that "power politics" will disappear overnight is living in a far-away world of tomorrow.

He therefore proposes that the United Nations continue their present coöperation to build two security air forces: one to patrol the East, and the other to guard the West. These forces would be extremely mobile, relatively inexpensive and need not be very large. They would, of course, constitute only an interim precaution until final peace is achieved.

Michie seems to overlook the possibility that the air police power might eventually need to be backed up by land forces. His lengthy demonstration of how successfully the British have used air force to bind their empire together is hardly a valid argument. The bombing of primitive tribes is quite a far cry from the bombing of a modern nation which has demonstrated its ability to survive the worst kind of blitz.

Our own air authorities are divided in opinion over the possibilities of such an air force. Unfortunately, our civil air-transport policy is equally inchoate. The Clark Committee is still haggling over McCarran's "chosen instrument" bill. These three books differ in approach, but they all provide a challenge to complacency. Until the United Nations achieve a coherent air policy, our vision of an enduring peace seems doomed to remain a pipe-dream.

ALLAN SPALDING

The Age of Social Man

Diagnosis of Our Time, by Karl Mannheim. New York: Oxford University Press. 195 pages. $3.
On Living in a Revolution, by Julian Huxley. New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 242 pages. $2.50.
Faith, Reason and Civilization, by Harold J. Laski. New York: The Viking Press. 187 pages. $2.50.

THESE THREE BOOKS of essays written in wartime Britain all deal with a common theme: the quest for a new philosophy of values, urged upon our era by the major crisis in valuations that since the end of the First World War has led to instability and, consequently, to universal frustration. Equally convinced that the problems which our civilization faces today are not likely to be solved only by a military victory over German and Japanese imperialism, the sociologist Mannheim, the biologist Huxley and the political scientist Laski endeavor to determine whether and how their respective sciences can become instrumental in the recovery of a system of values. A new social integration built upon social awareness is sought by all three authors as a basis for a new faith and as an alternative to the brutal integration achieved by fascism.

The disagreement between Mannheim and Huxley on one side and Laski on the other, begins with the diagnosis of the crisis. For Mannheim economic problems and the antithesis of capitalism and communism have ceased to be predominant; in Huxley's opinion also purely economic motives are being superseded in favor of motives which he broadly calls social; whereas, Laski claims to apply the

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The Liberal Party

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ON

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tenets of classical Marxism to the issues which he treats.

Of the three interpreters of society, Mannheim adheres most closely to the middle way. He reiterates that there is a high premium on evolutionary methods, that only a pluralist approach to planning will be satisfactory and that disastrous risks are incurred through wrong planning. "If the sociological statement is true," Mannheim remarks, "that no society can survive without coördination of basic valuations, institutions and education, there must be democratic ways of fostering the growth of such a harmony in great society." While Mannheim's essays contain a number of valuable suggestions for implementing this program they sometimes appear disconnected and fragmentary, in sharp contrast to his previous books.

After having expatiated on the reasons why the era of liberalism and of competitive economy could do without religion, Mannheim tries to determine under what conditions the spiritual integration which a planned society needs, can be achieved by a reborn Christianity. But in the end the means of bringing about a coöperation of theology and of sociology, the most secular approach to the problem of human life, remain uncertain. Nor does this reconciliation contribute to the discussion of the problems of education for which one turns most eagerly to Mannheim's writings.

By comparison, Huxley's discussion of how a properly planned educational system can be a powerful aid toward social unification and progress is refreshingly concrete. He analyzes the two dualities in our educational system, one created by the class cleavage between rich and poor, and the other by the ideological cleavage between religious bodies and society as a whole. For him the abolition of these cleavages will permit the achievement of that "unified [but diversified] system" which is needed for a revitalization of our society.

Huxley's philosophical creed is contained in his essay "Philosophy in a World at War." It is a brilliant restatement of the case for monism and, at the same time, an interesting attempt to show how we can profit from the findings of modern psychology, especially psychoanalysis, for a successful social adaptation in a world of uncertainties.

However, the most valuable contributions made by Huxley, one of the inspirers of the British Political and Economic Planning group, are in the field of planning for the benefit of the community at large. A hitherto unpublished essay on "Reconstruction and Peace: Needs and Opportunities" is, in spite of its conciseness, as good a blueprint for a rationally organized Europe as has ever been designed. Seldom has the question of Germany's postwar fate been so thoroughly integrated into a discussion of a planned reconstruction of the entire Continent.

The riddle which both Mannheim and Huxley have left unsolved is how the resistance of the powerful forces opposing national and international planning can possibly be overcome by the merely evolutionary means conceived by these authors. For Laski, our acquisitive society has completely lost the capacity of evoking faith and of maintaining a purpose which binds it together that nothing except the general transformation into a socialist society can save our civilization.

In previous writings Laski frequently discussed the con-

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ditions for an extension of the democratic revolution. In this historical essay he somewhat unexpectedly identifies this revolution with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and attributes to the society created in Soviet Russia, and to that society alone, "the mysterious power of renovating values, of renewing the faith of man in himself." It is Laski's thesis that the role of the Russian Revolution in our time is similar to that of the Church in the early Christian era.

Laski derives from this parallel a masterpiece of intellectual history: a comparison between the writings of the "priests and prophets" of our time with those of Epicurus, Polybius and their contemporaries. But in the field of politics Laski's new evaluation of Soviet Russia is far from convincing. Stalingrad becomes the post-hoc justification of everything Lenin initiated and of the entire course which Russia has followed since the Revolution. It is assumed that the Russian will to resist the German onslaught is due entirely to the Soviet economy in the inter-war years which actually furthered the welfare of all citizens, and to what extent the military feats of the Russians may also be supported by older conceptions such as patriotism, is not investigated by Laski. In discussing the "democratic" features of life in present-day Russia, he admits that the freedom of the Soviet citizen consists only in the absence of one fear: that of facing unemployment. This, however, means that Laski seeks to equate security and freedom.

In his "Where Do We Go from Here?" the same author has demonstrated that Hitler too had given to the masses a modicum of security by planning techniques. Has Laski now abandoned the hope that something like a planning for freedom will be possible?

The difficulties of entering the age of social man, which is also the dawn of the age of science, will not be lessened by ignoring them wholly or in part as Mannheim and Huxley do. But neither does the assessment of the values inherent in the Russian experiment profit from astonishing historical parallels.

HENRY W. EHRMANN

No Mystery

The Sleepy Lagoon Mystery, by Guy Endore. Los Angeles: Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee, 129 West Second Street, Los Angeles 12, Cal. 48 pages. 15 cents.

THE "Sleepy Lagoon" case is no mystery. The plot is crystal-clear. Its villains are not the victims—twelve kids of Mexican descent now serving terms up to life for the alleged murder of one individual—but the Los Angeles press and police, Judge Charles W. Fricke who presided over their trial, prosecutors Barnes and Shoemaker of the District Attorney's office, and the "good people" of the City of the Angels who found in the case an outlet for the pent-up aggressiveness of a guilt-conscious community.

On the basis of the flimsiest evidence a dozen boys of Mexican origin, no different from other teen-agers except for their belonging to a discriminated-against minority, were sent to San Quentin prison, each charged with the same murder, each as innocent as the other. They were hunted down and beaten up by the police to force confessions of something they had not done. They were tried before a judge, well known for his anti-Mexican bias, whose words and rulings so prejudiced the jury that the whole proceeding should have been declared a mistrial.

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They were confronted by witnesses whose testimony was mainly hearsay evidence and clearly inadmissible. They had to listen to a man named Ed Duran Ayres, head of the Bureau of Foreign Relations of the Los Angeles County Sheriff's office, who told the jury that they belonged to an inferior race. They were denied haircuts and fresh clothing while in jail, to make them look as degenerate and repulsive as possible in the courtroom. Their legal counsel were prevented from freely and easily conferring with them during sessions and even during recesses. They were found guilty by a jury on which no Mexican was sitting, which throughout the thirteen weeks of the trial was constantly exposed to the lurid howling of a press run amok, and which in effect was instructed by the judge to find the accused guilty.

Who killed José Díaz? That question was not solved in the "Sleepy Lagoon" trial and may never be solved. In any case, the accused were convicted long before the jury brought in the verdict. Why, indeed, did the murder of a young Mexican stir up such furor in Southern California? Because the "good people," after forcing discrimination, poverty, insecurity and low social status on the Mexican minority, had to prove to themselves that their victims were members of an untrustworthy and vicious race.

This passionate pamphlet records one of the most ghastly social and legal crimes perpetrated by a bigoted and misguided majority against a helpless and intimidated minority in the history of our democracy. Even if at times Mr. Endore's fancy gets the better of him, as in his effort to link Hearst with Hitler as the immediate instigators of racial disunity, he is to be praised for having laid bare the facts of this notorious trial, as tragic a miscarriage of justice as has occurred during this war. And to Carey McWilliams and the Sleepy Lagoon Defense Committee must go the credit for carrying on the legal fight in behalf of the twelve Mexican kids, innocent victims of racial prejudice.

HEINZ H. F. EULAU

A Correction

The name of the Russian general who was defeated at the battle of Tannenberg was incorrectly printed in last week's New Republic as Sazonov. It should have been Samsonov.

Contributors

GERHART SAENGER is the assistant director of the Social Research Laboratory at the College of the City of New York. He is the author of "Today's Refugees: Tomorrow's Children," and has contributed articles to The American Scholar, Survey Graphic, The Journal of Social Psychology and The Sociological Review.

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